


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
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## MOBILIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

BY

COLONEL LARRY L. TECH  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL SIDNEY A. HUMBERSON  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID P. WILHELM

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mobilization structure. The growing reliance on Reserve and National Guard forces to help provide a conventional deterrent strategy is tied to the time-sensitive mobilization of forces in being. The study concludes that mobilization and deployment improvements can be realized through the implementation of the alternatives studied. However, long term (ideal) solutions will be realized over time and with the availability of additional resources.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

MOBILIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

GROUP STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel Larry L. Tech  
Lieutenant Colonel Sidney A. Humberson  
Lieutenant Colonel David P. Wilhelm

US Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013  
11 June 1984

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US Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"Mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves"

by

Colonel Larry L. Tech  
Lieutenant Colonel Sidney A. Humberson  
Lieutenant Colonel David P. Wilhelm

11 June 1984

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## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR(S): Larry L. Tech, COL, INF  
Sidney A. Humberson, LTC, FA  
David P. Wilhelm, LTC, CE

TITLE: Mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves

FORMAT: Group Study Project

DATE: 11 June 1984 PAGES: 132 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The study examines solutions to issues surfaced during a mobilization planning exercise conducted at the US Army War College, 29-30 October 1983. Specifically the question is whether it is feasible to relieve over-taxed mobilization stations through the utilization of state owned facilities. The study is oriented at a specific geographical region and utilizes data gathered from an existing state owned training site within the mobilization area of a mobilization station identified as over-taxed. Additionally, data was obtained using a review of existing literature, and personal interviews of Reserve and Active officers across the mobilization structure. The growing reliance on Reserve and National Guard Forces to help provide a conventional deterrent strategy is tied to the timely mobilization of forces in being. It is concluded that mobilization and deployment improvements can be effected through the implementation of the alternatives studied. However, long term (ideal) solutions will be realized over time and with the availability of additional resources.



## PREFACE

This group study was produced under the supervision of the US Army War College Land Systems Laboratory (AWCLSL). The scope and general methodology were outlined by the Study Advisor. Each group member observed a two day mobilization seminar conducted 29-30 October 1983 at the AWCLS which was the basis for the study objective. This research paper is designed to support recommended solutions to mobilization deficiencies specifically disclosed during the above referenced seminar. The study group members selected to participate in this research based on prior assignments and experience at virtually every level of the military mobilization structure - even though the specific issues addressed in this paper relate directly to findings of the October exercise, and pertain directly to the geographical area within Army Readiness Mobilization Region VIII, they very well may have applicability to the other eight Readiness Regions. The effort of this research will provide for specific recommendations to specific mobilization deficiencies identified and described in the AWCLSL mobilization seminar report.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

This study was conducted as part of the United States Army War College Military Studies Program under the supervision of the Land Systems Laboratory, Carlisle Barracks. Specific issues, goals, objectives and assistance were provided to the study group by that Agency. The specific issue to be addressed in the report is described in detail later in this Chapter.

The study group was organized in September 1983 after the issues, goals and objectives were defined by the center for Land Warfare. The group consisted of three members with several years of experience in mobilization systems in both active and reserve components at all levels.

The scope of this study has been established so that with the limited time resources available, conclusions and recommendations could be made on very specific issues and action could be taken on those recommendations with minimum impact to peripheral mobilization actions.

### BACKGROUND

There have been a myriad of studies over the past several years on the mobilization of the Army in the event of a partial, full or total mobilization. Several of those studies were reviewed and studied in preparation for this research paper. (Refer to bibliography attached to this report.) Procedures to be used, and the sequence of action taken during this study effort are as follows:

- a. Purpose and objectives prescribed by Center for Land Warfare.
- b. Establishment of a group study and designation and selection of study group members.
- c. Study group member participation in the mobilization seminar conducted for US Army Mobilization and Deadlines Region VIII during October 1983. This seminar (exercise) was conducted by Ketron, Inc. 1700 N. Moore Street, Arlington, VA at the War Gaming Center, Carlisle Barracks. The Center for War Gaming was the Department of the Army Proponent. This exercise established the basis for significant issues relevant to the mobilization effort and most specifically the basis for the issues to be pursued.
- d. Preliminary after action reports of the above referenced exercise were reviewed to determine study objectives and program study methodology and procedures.
- e. Questionnaires were prepared so during research visits, time could be constructively used and data collected could be properly categorized and analyzed. See Appendix 1 for questionnaire format.
- f. Extensive interviews were conducted with representatives of the affected headquarters/agencies. Interviews conducted were taped and are on file in the US Army War College library. Translations of tapes conducted by General officer interviews and those individuals having the most direct influence on the study findings have been made and are at Appendix 1, this report.
- g. Extensive review was made of the Army's Mobilization Plans, Operations Plans, Mobilization Troop Stationing Plans, and Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System. Detailed analysis of the impact

of these reviews are not addressed further in this report because of classification and the extent to which these documents impact on the scope of this study.

### ISSUES

Mobilization issues (problems) identified as a result of the US Army Mobilization and Readiness Region VIII Mobilization seminar reported in Appendix 1, to the final report of that exercise prepared by Ketron, Inc., 1700 N. Moore Street, Arlington, VA 22209. This report is available in the USAWC library.

Specific issues addressed in this study are taken directly from the above referenced report as follows:

a. Issue 3a. Expansion of Mobilization Station Capabilities to house and train Incoming Rescue Component Units (RCUs).

(1) Shortages in housing and training areas exist at Fort Carson (For both annual training and mobilization).

(2) Fort Carson has a proposed but unfunded MCA project to construct a 5000 man RCU facility. TAGS proposed to exert their influence to get project approved and funded at a higher priority.

(3) Deployment activities (rail) may have to be sifted to other locations (outside mobilization stations) to meet requirements.

(4) RCU's may have to train and live in tent cities instead of barracks.

The purpose of this study is to determine the feasibility of utilizing state owned military facilities as mobilization stations to alleviate identified mobilization deficiencies described above.

## METHODOLOGY

Methodology used for data collection, analysis and evaluation is described as follows:

a. Data Collection was accomplished utilizing the following:

(1) Review of previous mobilization studies, (Refer to bibliography attached to this report).

(2) Observation and participation in Keutron Mobilization exercise.

(3) Interviews and discussions with representatives of headquarters and agencies listed above.

(4) Review of current operations plans, mobilization plans and mobilization exercise after action reports.

b. Analysis and Evaluations were accomplished using seminar procedures, individual and group discussions, and the elimination process.

The basis used for the analysis and evaluation were:

(1) Based on data collected what are the advantages and disadvantages if:

(a) Mobilization Stations within Army Readiness Region VIII area remain the same.

(b) Camp Guernsey is designated a FORSCOM Mobilization Station.

(c) An alternative (such as mobilization at Home Station for Reserve Component Units) would be more feasible than either (a) or (b) above.

(2) Provided Camp Guernsey is designated a FORSCOM Mobilization Station what effect will it have on:

- (a) Current Plans and Procedures within ARMR VIII.
- (b) Current facilities within ARMR VIII.
- (c) Personnel, training, logistics, administration, budgeting and resources as they currently exist.
- (d) Mobilization efficiency.

Coordination was affected between study group members and the headquarters and agencies that would be effected by, or could impact on the results of this effort. Principal agencies contacted were as follows:

- a. Headquarters, Department of the Army, (ODCSOPS).
- b. National Guard Bureau.
- c. Headquarters, Forces Command.
- d. Headquarters, Sixth US Army.
- e. Headquarters, Army Readiness Region VIII.
- f. Fort Carson.
- g. The Adjutant General, Wyoming Army National Guard.

Throughout this study extensive coordination was maintained with the Adjutant General, Wyoming Army National Guard, in as much as he is currently designated as the Governor's officer-in-charge of Camp Guernsey. Action to be taken as a result of this study would be initiated by him. During March 1984 General Spence signed a letter drafted and staffed by this study group which would designate Camp Guernsey as a FORSCOM Mobilization Station. This letter remains undated and has not been forwarded, pending review of this study by the staff of the US Army War College. Upon completion of the Administrative review of this this letter will be dated and dispatched through Chief, National Guard Bureau to Commander,

FORSCOM for final action. (Refer to letter, State of Wyoming Military Department, subject "Mobilization and Deployment Improvement Proposal," undated, at Appendix 2). Detailed reviews were made of Personnel and Administration, facilities and mobilization planning as they pertain to Camp Guernsey. Those reviews are at Chapters II through IV this report. Chapter V of this report contains the conclusions that were drawn from the detailed reviews. Recommendations for decisions and implementation are contained at the end of Chapter V.



## CHAPTER II

### PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

#### GENERAL

Personnel and administration considerations are paramount in making a determination as to the feasibility of recommending Camp Guernsey, Wyoming, be established as a Mobilization Station. The strength ceilings established in all three components of the Army necessitate that personnel assets be authorized in a most scrupulous manner. The purpose of this annex is to examine, in detail, personnel and administrative capabilities that currently exist and the requirements that would exist in the event Camp Guernsey is designated a federal mobilization station. The contents of this Chapter are applicable in the event of a partial, full or total mobilization.

#### CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL MANNING

Camp Guernsey, designated as a National Guard State Training Site, is currently authorized manning from two principal documents as follows:

a. State Area Command Table of Distribution and Allowances (STARC TDA).

(1) Wyoming STARC TDA NGW8BUAA, dated 3 September 1983, effective 1 November 1983, specifically authorizes personnel manning in paragraph 17, to operate Camp Guernsey.

(2) Specific positions are as follows (extracted from TDA NGW8BUAA):

| <u>PARA</u>     | <u>LINE</u> | <u>DESCRIPTION</u>           | <u>GR</u> | <u>ID</u> | <u>STRENGTH</u> |             |
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|                 |             |                              |           |           | <u>REQ</u>      | <u>AUTH</u> |
| 17              | 01          | Post Commander               | 06        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 02          | Facility Engineer            | 05        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 03          | Deputy Post Commander        | 05        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 04          | Operations Officer           | 04        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 05          | Range Control Officer        | 04        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 06          | Post Surgeon                 | 04        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 07          | Ammunition Technician        | W0        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 08          | Unit Personnel Technician    | W0        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 09          | General Supply Technician    | W0        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 10          | Command Sergeant Major       | E9        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 11          | Operations Sergeant          | E8        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 12          | Construction Inspector       | E7        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 13          | Subsistence Sergeant         | E7        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 14          | Training NCO                 | E6        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 15          | Ammunition Technical Advisor | E6        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 16          | Automotive Repair Foreman    | E6        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 17          | Personnel Sergeant           | E6        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 18          | Supply Sergeant              | E6        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 19          | Design Draftsman             | E5        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 20          | Engineer Equipment Mechanic  | E5        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 21          | Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic     | E5        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 22          | Personnel Records Specialist | E5        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 23          | Petroleum Supply Specialist  | E5        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| 17              | 24          | Clerk Typist                 | E4        | K         | 1               | 1           |
| Paragraph Total |             |                              |           |           | 24              | 24          |

(Note: All positions above are National Guard status personnel--not on active duty)

b. State Training Site Manning Document. There is no specific authorization document for the operation of Camp Guernsey as a State Training Site. This is not uncommon as will be described in subsequent paragraphs. However, there is personnel manning which impacts on the daily operations of this facility as follows:

(1) Training Site Headquarters. Authorized four (4) Federal Civil Service employees to manage the facility on a day-to-day basis.

(2) Unit Training Equipment Site. Authorized two (2) General Mechanics to maintain equipment located at Camp Guernsey for use by units training at this facility during Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and Annual Training (AT).

(3) United States Property and Fiscal Officer Warehouse. Authorized Nine (9) Federal Civil Service employees to perform general supply functions for units during IDT and AT.

(4) State Combined Support Maintenance Shop. Authorized twenty-three (23) Federal Civil Service employees to support the maintenance program for the Wyoming Army National Guard.

#### CURRENT ORGANIZATION MANNING STUDIES

a. The Manpower Division, National Guard Bureau, is currently conducting an analysis and intensive evaluation of state-owned and operated training sites. This evaluation is based on findings of a preliminary study conducted by that same agency in 1982. Following is a transcript of the General Findings of that preliminary evaluation:

The Army National Guard currently operates 43 major training sites across the United States which all have the same mission--to provide and maintain real assets by and on which unit training may be conducted. There is currently no standardization in the organization, functions and manning of the ARNG training sites. This lack of continuity makes most comparisons among the training sites not only difficult but also inaccurate. A comprehensive validation of all the ARNG training sites is needed.

b. The National Guard Bureau is currently conducting an analysis and intensive evaluation of resourcing and staffing State Training Sites which have been designated Mobilization Sites (there are currently nine such sites). Their evaluation includes three general functional aspects of the staffing/resourcing problems as described below:

(1) Each site requires a staff to provide peacetime training support to units training at the site. The size of the requirement should be related to average monthly manday usage. A methodology to relate average monthly manday usage, the several functions performed at

the site and the spaces to perform them must be developed along with a justification of the relationship. The elements should be sized so that the site with the highest average monthly manday usage has the most required spaces. Facilities provided and staffed should also be a factor.

(2) Each site requires a minimum planning staff to perform mobilization and deployment planning functions. This element should be sized so that the site with the highest mobilization troop density has the most planners and the site with the least mobilization troop density is supported by a minimum number. The number of units mobilizing at the site should also be considered in determining requirements.

(3) Each site will require a small cadre of spaces which are required for critical mobilization functions only, but must be organized and trained in peacetime to perform those critical functions immediately upon mobilization. Examples might be ADP, communications, and minimal maintenance functions. These spaces might be included in the planning cell analysis in 5b above.

#### CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL MISSION

a. The organization mission statement for the Wyoming ARNG STARC TDA is as follows:

##### POST MOBILIZATION.

1. Exercise command over mobilized ARNG units and OPCON of other federal units as directed by CONUSA.
2. Maintain close and continuous cooperation and coordination with the post-mobilization state headquarters.

3. Direct and support the mobilization activities of mobilized ARNG units until their arrival at the mobilization station or point of embarkation for direct deploying units.
4. Coordinate the submission of required reports for mobilized units to the mobilization stations and other agencies as directed.
5. Provide required support and implementing instructions to mobilized units to accomplish necessary administrative and personnel processing at home station.
6. Provide for and place assets under the operational control of the USPFO to assist with the accomplishment of post mobilization logistics, fiscal, and other mobilization support requirements.
7. Provide for continuous operation and serve as the primary channel of communications between mobilizing units and CONUSA's mobilization stations, support installations and coordinating installations.
8. Provide limited assistance for family members of military personnel who do not have access to a Class I installation.
9. Perform post attack damage assessment.
10. Maintain close liaison with government and nongovernment agencies required as having a role in or impact on any identified mobilization problems.
11. Provide for the continued operation and control of designated ARNG support facilities which are no longer required.
12. Provide for the State Military Academy to conduct accelerated OCS/NCOES and other training programs.

b. There is no specific mission statement for each state-owned/operated training site within the Army National Guard; however, the vast

majority of state installation functions are the same. The National Guard Bureau has recognized functions common to all state-operated installations as follows:

|                                      |  |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| Personnel Administration             | Roving Patrols                               |
| Nonappropriated Fund Administration  | Funding                                      |
| Safety                               | Programming                                  |
| Public Affairs                       | Budgeting                                    |
| Community Relations                  | Disbursing                                   |
| AAFES Coordination                   | Payroll                                      |
| Moral/Welfare Fund Management        | Accounting                                   |
| Club Management                      | Financial Reports                            |
| Printing/Duplicating                 | Metalworking Services                        |
| Order Publishing                     | Building Preventive Maintenance              |
| Correspondence                       | Painting (Interior and Exterior)             |
| Mail and Distribution                | Fire Prevention                              |
| General Administrative Support       | Fire Protection                              |
| Switchboard                          | Fire Investigation                           |
| Post Security                        | Refuse Collection and Disposal               |
| Range Control                        | Gate Guards                                  |
| Troop Movements                      | Plumbing Services                            |
| Op Plans                             | Utilities Preventive Maintenance             |
| Mob Plans                            | Communications                               |
| Emergency Plans                      | Buildings and Grounds Maintenance            |
| Investigations                       | Surfaced Areas Maintenance                   |
| Training Activities                  | Railroad Maintenance                         |
| Training Area/Range Scheduling       | Custodial Services                           |
| Training Support                     | Engineering Equipment Maintenance            |
| Training Aids                        | Pest Control                                 |
| Training Area/Impact Area Management | Forestry Program                             |
| Weapons & Ammo Management            | Range Maintenance (In Coord w/FE)            |
| Ammo Storage                         | Fish & Wildlife Program                      |
| Ammo Issue                           | Land Management                              |
| Ammo Disposal                        | Carpentry Services                           |
| Ammo Inventory                       | Masonry Services                             |
| Food Services                        | Packing and Crating Services                 |
| BOQ/BEQ Administration               | Property Accountability                      |
| Shipping and Receiving               | Engineering Services                         |
| Warehousing                          | Contract Inspection and Warranty Enforcement |
| Materiel Storage                     | Architect Engineer                           |
| POL Storage and Disbursing           | Design Services                              |
| Materiel Management                  | Design Review                                |
| Inventory Management                 | Master Planning                              |
| General Supply Activities            | Liaison with District Engineer               |
| Stock Control                        | Utilities Procurement and Sales              |
| Local Purchase (Coord w/Procurement) | Project Development                          |
| FE Stock Control                     | Energy Program Management                    |
| FE Warehouse Operations              | Hazardous Waste Program Management           |
| Utility Plant & Systems Opn          | Local Purchase of FE Materiels               |
|                                      | Utility Plant & Systems Maint.               |

Utility Services (Heat, Water,  
Sewage, Telephone)  
Heating, Refrigeration, Air Con-  
ditioning & Mechanical Ventil-  
ation Equipment  
Engineer Programming & Budgeting  
RPMA Programming  
Resource Planning  
Engineer General Office Services/  
Admin. Spt.  
Coordination of Support w/Facili-  
ties Users  
FE Property Control  
Furnishings Management  
Pollution Abatement Program

POL Distribution & Dispensing  
Systems Maintenance  
Work Reception & Scheduling  
Planning, Estimating, Facility  
Inspection  
Management Engineering & Systems  
Real Property Management, Space  
Assignment & Facilities Utili-  
zation  
Coordination w/Engineer Troop  
Units  
Project Identification  
Guest Housing Maintenance  
Environmental Program Management  
Historic Preservation Management

#### SUMMARY

a. Brigadier General Wing, the Deputy Adjutant General, State of Wyoming and also a participant in the ARMR VIII Mobilization Exercise stated in the formal interview (see Appendix 1) that Camp Guernsey will not require additional manning provided that installation is designated a Federal Mobilization Site.

b. The mission statement of the Wyoming ARNG STARC TDA and the recognized functions of state-owned/operated training sites as determined by the National Guard Bureau will need not be expanded provided Camp Guernsey were to be designated a Federal Mobilization Site.

c. In as much as the mission statement of the installation will not be expanded based on a conversion from a state training site to a federal mobilization site, the manning requirements would not increase.

d. Based on the evaluations currently being conducted by the National Guard Bureau, in conjunction with FORSCOM headquarters and the Army headquarters, it must be implied that provided Camp Guernsey does become a federal mobilization station, that installation would be provided the same standard manning as determined by this evaluation. If the NGB evaluation determines a requirement for manning state-operated

mobilization sites (either drill or full-time status) beyond what the current manning authorized the Wyoming Army National Guard and/or Camp Guernsey, appropriate increases in manning would be applicable to either or both organizations.



## CHAPTER III

### FACILITIES

#### GENERAL

1. Mobilizations conducted for World War II, Korea and others determined that sufficient facilities was one of the important factors affecting the orderly transition of manpower from the general population into the armed forces.
2. Since the last "total mobilization," (World War II) many of the facilities used to support that effort have been either closed or partially deactivated such that in the event of a mobilization today, there would be a major requirement for construction and preparation for mobilization. Along these lines, there would also be proportionate drains in manpower, money, time and other important resources required to field a conventional force from the Reserve Components for even a partial mobilization.
3. This Chapter attempts to evaluate a proposed solution to Issue 3.A., The Short Fall of Facilities and Training Areas at Fort Carson, Colorado, one of the mobilization stations in the ten-state area which was studied during the ARMR VIII exercise. The proposed alternative defined in the exercise was to determine whether existing facilities in the region could be used to help alleviate the situation identified. Camp Guernsey, Wyoming, was proposed as a possible existing facility and the following discussion defines the capabilities of Camp Guernsey.

a. History: Camp Guernsey is located on the North Platte River and can be viewed from several points along the Oregon Trail. In 1842 Captain John C. Fremont wrote about the location in his journal, "There is just below the bend and on the left bank of the river, a small but handsome prairie which would be a good locality for a military post." The first permanent building construction was started in 1938 by the Work Projects Administration (WPA). The installation was used during World War II by the Regular US Army and then was inactive until 1951. Additional land was acquired in 1951 and an Artillery Firing Range was established. Year-round training for the total Army has been conducted at Camp Guernsey ever since. Army National Guard, Air National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Regular US Army and Regular US Air Force units from twenty-two states have conducted training at Camp Guernsey in the last ten years. Camp Guernsey is considered to have one of the best artillery ranges in the Sixth Army area. It currently is used by Artillery, Engineers, and Infantry units plus various other arms.

b. Installation Description:

(1) Location: Camp Guernsey is located in Platte County, in the Southeastern quarter of Wyoming, more precisely Latitude 42° 25' 00" North, Longitude 104° 44' 00" West. The nearest urban area is the town of Guernsey, population 1,512, bordering the camp. A major railroad freight terminal is located in Guernsey, and the nearest bus terminal is located in Wheatland, 25 miles distant. A commercial air terminal is located at Scottsbluff, Nebraska, 66 miles distant capable of accommodating (727 type commercial), (C141 military) aircraft.

(2) Property Control: State-owned 24,213 acres. Bureau of Land Management (Land Withdrawal) 5,779 acres, for a total of 30,092 acres.

|                              |                    |
|------------------------------|--------------------|
| (a) Cantonment Area          | 306 acres          |
| (b) Army Aviation Facilities | 210 acres          |
| (c) South Training Area      | 7,580 acres        |
| (d) North Training Area      | 16,749 acres       |
| (e) Impact Area              | 3,787 acres        |
| (f) Ammunition Storage Area  | <u>1,360</u> acres |

|       |              |
|-------|--------------|
| TOTAL | 29,992 acres |
|-------|--------------|

(3) Physical Description: This site consists of 29,992 acres, of which 26,205 acres are available for training. The terrain is rolling hills covered with blue grama, buffalo grass, and sagebrush. Trees along the drainages are cottonwood, with ponderosa pine and junipers on the hillsides and tops. The elevation at Camp Guernsey ranges from 4,300 feet to 5,280 feet above mean sea level (MLS). The major soil type is a fine sandy loam, M-4 Ustall. There are four major sedimentary rock formations, conglomerate, dolomite, limestone, and sandstone. The four distinct seasons are prevalent with the mean daytime summer temperature in the mid-eighties, and the mean daytime winter temperature in the low-twenties. Average precipitation is 15.06 inches, 70 percent of which falls during the growing season, primarily in June. The prevailing winds are northwesterly. Maximum winds, averaging 40 MPH, are in the latter part of February and March.

(4) Facilities: There are sufficient buildings, metal huts, and trailer houses to house 182 Officers and 1,730 enlisted personnel. Use of tents, GP medium on hand, on available concrete slabs would increase housing to accommodate an additional 200 enlisted personnel. Mess facilities will support 1,800 people per meal with a Troop Issue Subsistence Activity (TISA). Field Accommodations are available to support additional personnel. There are three administrative buildings, seven supply buildings, vehicle shop (ten bays), vehicle

hard-stands (84,700 square yards), vehicle wash racks (36 stalls), and an ammunition storage and issue facility on site. Medical facilities consist of one dispensary building available for Reserve Component medical support. Platte County Memorial Hospital (43 beds) is located in Wheatland, 25 miles distant.

(5) Army Aviation Facilities: This consists of 210 acres, one administrative/operations building (1,200 square feet), one hanger (2,829 square feet), 20 helicopter tie-down pads, and apron (8,240 square yards). There are two runways, 14-31 (5,500 feet by 100 feet) and 16-34 (3,600 feet by 100 feet), with gravelled surfaces. Crash, fire and rescue equipment is available.

(6) Ranges:

| <u>Number</u> | <u>Type</u>                                   |
|---------------|---|
| 1.            | Field Artillery Scaled Range (M31 Trainer).   |
| 2.            | Hand Grenade Familiarization Course.          |
| 3.            | Demolition, Booby Trap, and Land-Mine Area.   |
| 4.            | Light Anti-armor Weapon Range.                |
| 5.            | Combat Pistol Range.                          |
| 6.            | Machine gun, 10-Meter Range.                  |
| 7.            | Sub-machine gun Range.                        |
| 8.            | Gunship Harmonization Range.                  |
| 9.            | A. Recoilless Rifle Range.                    |
|               | B. Machine gun, M60 Transition Range.         |
|               | C. Machine gun, M2 (.50 caliber) Field Range. |
| 10.           | Grenade Launcher Range.                       |
| 11.           | Basic 25-meter Night Fire Range.              |
| 12.           | Field Firing Range.                           |
| 13.           | Mortar (all calibers).                        |
| 14.           | Artillery (all calibers except 175mm).        |
|               | Min range, direct fire                        |
|               | Max range, 16,000 meters                      |

(7) Specialized Training Areas: Float bridging, rafting, and watermanship training can be conducted on the Platte River and Lake Guernsey. Two Rock-crusher sites with limestone quarries are on post. One compass course with 65 points in 48 acres, and a squad size chemical

confidence chamber is available. One nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flying area with four separate training courses is available.

(8) Utilities: The water system has a capacity of 189,000 gallons per day and will support 3,780 persons. The sewage treatment plant is lagoon-type with a capacity of 132,300 gallons per day.

(9) Restrictions: Restricted airspace for artillery firing available 1 March thru 30 November annually. Controlled firing areas can be obtained at other times. Maximum ordinate cannot exceed 23,500 feet mean sea level.


(10) Point of Contact: During duty hours: Autovon: 943-6273/6396; Commercial: (307) 772-6273 or (307) 836-2619/2823. After duty hours: Commercial (307) 632-7350 or (307) 836-2339.

c. Maps: To the back of this chapter are maps showing range and airfield facilities.

#### SUMMARY

a. This facility is of sufficient size and quality to be utilized to house and train field artillery brigade-sized units of up to 3,500 utilizing some tentage. Other type units of equivalent size could be accommodated.


b. The location of this facility is such that the utilization of it for mobilization would enhance the overall mobilization effort with minimum expenditure of funds.





CAMP  
GUERNSEY  
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## CHAPTER IV

### MOBILIZATION PLANNING

#### GENERAL

Current reserve mobilization plans are dependent on an orderly transition from a peacetime to a total war situation. Plans are written with scenarios which provide ample warning to the US and its allies, and allow preplanned mobilization steps to be systematically accomplished in preparation for war. Present planning is primarily oriented toward an initial intensification of hostilities in Europe and an eventual conflict resulting primarily in that area. Present strategic studies discount this concept and are directed toward conflicts developed initially by third world parties in other areas with eventual involvement of the major powers. This involvement of the major powers could take place in the area of the initial conflict and/or Europe, and in either case would require the continued commitment of forces initially earmarked for Europe.

This dispersed-type of conflict could require the mobilization of Reserve Components to other theaters prior to the deployment of Reforger and European reserve units.

This scenario would create a major overflow of personnel at the mobilization stations and would overtax the physical plants and training facilities.

The present plans also call for the mobilization and troop buildup to be concentrated primarily at major active and semi-active installations throughout the United States. Many of these installations will reach troop densities of 40,000+ personnel and their associated equipment. Tactically, given the good possibility of an actual or threatened nuclear confrontation, this would not be sound planning. Nuclear threats require a dispersed situation and these large mobilization sites, with their high troop and equipment densities, would make lucrative targets.

Of either of the above very possible situations (full non-European conflict and/or nuclear confrontation) would develop, the resulting mobilization would be difficult. Sufficient facilities,, trained personnel, and/or transportation capabilities do not exist at many of the major sites to handle such an overloaded condition. Many of these problems could be solved by decentralizing mobilization and utilizing state owned facilities.

#### MAJOR ADVANTAGES OF UTILIZING STATE OWNED FACILITIES

1. Permits greater dispersion of units, equipment, and mobilization resources and further increases nuclear survivability.
2. Decreases saturation of major mobilization station support and training facilities.
3. Spreads out the transportation requirements.
4. Utilizes existing facilities and civilian personnel who presently support these posts.
5. Utilizes the trained personnel assigned to the State Headquarters--planning, personnel, finance, logistics, and transportation.

6. Many retired technicians and other reserve component retirees live within the immediate area and would be available.

#### DISADVANTAGES AND CONSIDERATIONS

1. FMP (FORSCOM Mobilization Plan) and supporting plans would require revisions. Mobilization plans are complex and require extensive coordination between many major headquarters and civilian departments.

2. MTBS (Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan) would have to be adjusted to provide additional support personnel. Some of these units are presently organic to the state and are assigned elsewhere.

3. Difficult to cross level equipment and personnel in a dispersed posture.

4. Computer links do not presently exist. Project VIABLE and other technological advances will solve some of the computer problems. This problem should be a major consideration in present and future communication and information systems.

5. Some studies indicate, "It would be difficult to validate units." Units presently are evaluated yearly. This evaluation should be designed to also fulfill the validation requirement. In addition to this evaluation all Readiness Group commanders and Unit Advisors know the status of the units they support.

#### ANALYSIS OF CONSIDERATIONS

The majority of the disadvantages can be solved by additional planning and would require revision of present plans. The overscinding consideration is the tactical need for dispersion. This consideration alone dictates dispersed mobilization.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### CONCLUSIONS

1.a. Camp Guernsey has the capacity to accommodate approximately thirty-five hundred (3,500) personnel. This accommodation includes permanent housing and messing for approximately two thousand (2,000) personnel (See Chapter 3).

b. Ranges, training areas, and support activities to training requirements are sufficient to support an Infantry Brigade plus separate battalions (Refer to Chapter 3).

c. Transportation (land and air) facilities will accommodate logistical requirements necessary to support the mobilization effort (Refer to Chapter 3).

d. The designation of Camp Guernsey as a FORSCOM Mobilization Station can be accomplished with no additional manpower requirements, either on active duty or inactive duty status (Refer to Chapter 2).

e. The State Area Command (STARC), Wyoming Army National Guard has the mission and manning authorization to plan for and support Camp Guernsey as a FORSCOM Mobilization Site (Refer to Chapter 4).

f. Camp Guernsey is capable of meeting Mobilization Station mission requirements listed below:

- o Receive, house, support and deploy utilized reserve component units IAW their deployment date.

- o Provide personnel support by:

- oo in/out processing RCU; and IRR fillers.
- oo verifying DA Data Base files.
- oo accessing RCU; and IRRs.
- oo cross-leveling personnel.
- oo processing retirees to active duty.
- oo validating RCU's in personnel readiness.
- oo providing required services.
- oo POM Processing.
- o Provide Training support by:
  - oo providing training resources.
  - oo validating RCU readiness.
  - oo providing coordination and control for RCU deployment operations.
- oo submitting all operations reports to higher headquarters.
- o Provide logistics support in the areas of:
  - oo unit movement.
  - oo equipment cross leveling.
  - oo equipment readiness validation
- o Provide other support, e.g.:
  - oo JAG
  - oo Security/law enforcement
  - oo medical
  - oo chaplain
  - oo finance

Modifications to present structure and/or plans will be required as follows:

- a. Installation of a secure data/communications link into the facility.

b. Inclusion of Camp Guernsey to studies on standardization of Mobilization Stations currently being done by National Guard Bureau.

c. Changes to FORSCOM Mobilization Troop Bases Stationing Plan (MTBSP). Changes must include provisions to provide support (i.e. engineer, medical, air traffic control) early in the mobilization process to Camp Guernsey.

Designation of Camp Guernsey as a FORSCOM Mobilization Station will relieve Fort Carson, Colorado of its over subscribed mobilization requirement.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

2.a. Camp Guernsey, Wyoming be designated a FORSCOM Mobilization Station at the earliest possible date.

b. Action be initiated by appropriate headquarters, to implement modifications required and described above, to fully support this recommendation.

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## APPENDIX 1

### (INTERVIEWS AND TRANSCRIPTS) TO MOBILIZATION OF THE GUARD AND RESERVES

#### INTRODUCTION

This interview represents one of several portions of an analytical effort concerning mobilization of Reserve and National Guard Forces within a ten-state area. The overall effort is being done to provide follow-up study to an exercise conducted at the US Army War College by Ketron, Inc., and the Land Systems Laboratory, USAWC.

The purpose of this interview is to capture reflective thoughts on issues raised during the exercise and to gain insights from various mobilization structural levels, concerning the feasibility of conducting another study and planning regarding alternative solutions to Issue 3.A., Expansion of Mobilization Station Capabilities to House and Train Incoming Reserve Component Units (Appendix 1, Issues, attached). [Note: To be provided to interviewee as part of introduction and serves as working document.]

The interview is designed for use in interviewing commanders and mobilization planners throughout the mobilization structure, e.g., The Adjutant General WYARNG; Mobilization Planner WYARNG; Deputy Post Commander, Fort Carson, CO; Mobilization Planner, Fort Carson, CO; Commander, Sixth US Army; and Mobilization Planner, Sixth US Army.

Indepth Interview

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Rank \_\_\_\_\_

Position \_\_\_\_\_

NOTE: Allow interviewee time to scan issues sheet, then call attention to Issue 3.A.

1. Considering that shortages exist in housing and training areas at Fort Carson, CO (for both annual training and mobilization), what would you see as an optimum solution?

a. Housing -

b. Training areas -

2. Due to the potential of having to shift (rail) deployment activities to other locations (outside of mobilization station) to meet requirements, what actions can be taken to alleviate this shortfall?

3. Would you consider the utilization of existing state-owned training facilities a viable means of expanding mobilization station capabilities? (e.g., Camp Guernsey, WY)

a. If yes, why? [Continue with Question 4.]

b. If no, why? [Continue with Question 7.]

3.a. Yes

4. Can the (state, mobilization station, headquarters) support this option without additional manning (TDA, technician/AGR)?

a. Yes

b. No. If not, where and what type, how many?

5. Can the community (surrounding area) support the influx of personnel during partial, total, full mobilization?

a. Yes

b. No. If no, what would be the optimum planning size based on this factor?

6. What, if any, are the limiting factors of this option? i.e.,

a. medical support

b. Quality of life support systems, laundry, Px, commissary, etc.

c. Organizational - Administrative/Finance

Logistical/Training

NOTE: Continue with Question 9.



3.a. No

7. What do you consider viable, realizing that there are constraints?  
(Mainly budgetary) (Are there others?)

8. What are the impacts of accepting these shortages?

a. Near-term -

b. Long-term -

NOTE: Continue with Question 9.

9. From your perspective, do you see this issue unique to this area and to Fort Carson, or is this a potential topic for study in the other CONUSA areas?

10. Of the other issues, which by priority do you feel can be addressed with a change in policy or, at minimum, cost?

11. In your judgment, are these issues representative of existing conditions or are there others which should be addressed? (List responses)

13. Do you feel similar exercises should be conducted in the future?

a. Yes - why? How can it be more effective?

b. No - why? What other format should be used?

14. Is there any additional information you would like to add in this effort?

Thank you for your time and interest!

ISSUES  
ARMR VIII SEMINAR GAME  
29-30 October 1983

1. PERSONNEL

- A. TAG AUTHORITY TO CROSS LEVEL. Not all units will be able to mobilize at 100% strength. ARCOM Cdr's/TAG have authority to cross level personnel and equipment until "issuance of an Alert for Active Duty or declaration of M-Day. Assets of an alerted RC unit will not be redistributed until arrival at MS, unless otherwise directed by CONUSA or ARMR."
- B. RC UNIT PERSONNEL NO SHOWS. It is doubtful that 100% of all assigned personnel will respond to a mobilization call-up. Consensus of attendees was that a 95% show rate could be expected. FORSCOM indicated that for a number of valid reasons, approximately 30% of personnel would not be available to deploy with their unit.
- C. DEFERRING OF SOLDIERS. Regulations require, with few exceptions, that all members of RC units be mobilized and report to the MS. There are significant numbers of personnel known to qualify for deferment which will create a burden on the MS when the RC units report. Many of those qualifying for deferment have key jobs in state or local agencies, Federal agencies or vital mobilization industries. Action should be taken to identify known deferrables and discharge those in key positions in peacetime.
- D. POST-MOBILIZATION FAMILY ASSISTANCE. Providing assistance to families of AC and RC personnel in the post-mobilization period will require careful management because of limited resources and the disruption of

normal channels for support. DA publications can be useful, but a command plan to brief the family along with the service member provides additional benefits. Further investigation is needed to determine the intent and capability of Federal agencies to provide medical support. Peacetime care cannot be expected in the long term. We must adopt a realistic, common sense approach in planning family assistance.

## 2. TRAINING

A. TRAINING AND ASSIGNMENT OF IRR'S. IRR's are assigned to MS, based upon unit requirements. Serious problems exist in this area:

- o IRR's are not given an opportunity to train with the RCU. Suggest returning to a 1970 program that had IRR's conducting their AT with the unit.

B. MOS TRAINING. RC troops are trained on modern equipment but cannot maintain their proficiency due to the unit having old/out-of-date equipment. RC's cannot maintain any form of proficiency. This is particularly true in the hard-skill MOS's.

BCT/AIT (combat series MOS's) summer of 1984 has been closed to TAG/ARCOM CDR's. This shuts off a major incentive for recruiting in that students no longer can receive their training during the college vacation period. Review to see if this policy can be changed.

RCU CDR's can conduct a form of pre BCT/AIT training to insure that new enlistees meet or surpass their training requirements. Some form of in-house training should be developed.

C. MOBILIZATION COURSES IN SERVICE SCHOOL CURRICULA. Although mobilization is in the curricula of Army Service Schools, US Army Command and

General Staff College and the US Army War College, the details of the instruction are not widely known. FORSCOM should insure that all major headquarters (NGB, DA, etc.) are coordinating for future mobilization planning courses.

### 3. LOGISTICS

#### A. EXPANSION OF MS CAPABILITIES TO HOUSE & TRAIN INCOMING RCU'S.

- o Shortages in housing and training areas exist at Ft. Carson.  
(For both AT and mobilization).
- o Ft. Carson has a proposed but unfunded MCA project to construct a 5000 man RCU facility. TAGS proposed to exert their influence to get project approved and funded at a higher priority.
- o Deployment activities (rail) may have to be shifted to other locations (outside MS) to meet requirements.
- o RCU's may have to train and live in tent cities instead of barracks.

B. TRAINING AMMUNITION. It is not clear as to who or what organization procures Class V training ammunition for mobilizing RCU's. Determine a clear and concise system for procurement, storage, allocation and issue to meet RCU mobilization training requirements.

C. AVAILABILITY OF "PURE" FOR REDISTRIBUTION. The equipment remaining at MS upon departure of POMCUS-type units is assumed to be available for issue to RCU units to fill equipment shortages. On the other hand, AMOPS specifies that higher priority claimants, i.e., theater commanders, DARCOM or DA have first priority for issue. Commanders of RCUs and MSs

must be aware that certain designated items of equipment in PURE may not be available for redistribution.

#### 4. COMMUNICATIONS

##### A. COMMUNICATIONS.

- o The STARC HF system frequency changes are costing a considerable amount of money. Additionally, STARCs are experiencing difficulty acquiring the proper crystals, therefore the capability of the net is adversely affected.
- o REMA has a significant amount of communications capability available for use by the military which is not fully understood or utilized.
- o Contact with RC units at HS may be difficult because only commercial modes of communication are available.
- o RC Units do not have adequate or compatible COMSEC and new generation equipment. Additionally, this type of equipment is not available from the PURE, because it is designated to accompany troops (TAT).

#### 5. PUBLIC AFFAIRS

A. PUBLIC AFFAIRS DURING MOBILIZATION PHASES. Problems related to media awareness of impending or ongoing mobilization steps can be anticipated. Some members of RC units have civilian jobs in the media and "leaks" to the press could occur at any level, from Washington down to the lowest level. Establish a good working relationship with the local media in peacetime in order to be better prepared to handle the mobilization public affairs problems.

## 6. HOME STATION

A. MOBILIZING UNITS REMAINING AT HS. Determine the requirements of allowing a RCU to remain at HS instead of going to MS as prescribed by the MTBSP. Consider the following areas/problems:

- o Potential saturation of MS due to late deployment of AC/RC units.
- o Provides the RC soldier a longer time to get his personal affairs in order.
- o Allows RC soldiers to live in a better surrounding (instead of tent city).
- o MS cannot support fragmented locations with administration, training or validation.
- o No central control of BBPCTD materiel for deployment of units.
- o RCUs cannot conduct training without their equipment. Don't separate the two.
- o States lack the capability to provide basic service, administration and logistics.
- o TAG Idaho has spent three years establishing Gowen Field as a MS after it was approved. Much easier to request than plan and execute.

B. DEPLOYMENT. Vehicle loading of TO&E equipment for shipment from HS to MS is a unit training responsibility. Remind all units that this responsibility must be exercised annually.



## 7. MOVEMENT

A. MOVEMENT CONTROL (HS TO MS). ARMR VIII OPLAN 1-83 establishes procedures for control of road convoy movement by STARCs within the respective state boundaries. STARCs envision no major problems. Other attendees (FEMA) visualize larger problems associated with related plans for non-military movements and population control during national emergencies.

## 8. CAPSTONE

A. FORSCOM CAPSTONE SELECTION. ARMR/RG should be consulted when selection is made for additions, deletions and changes of the Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL). All changes must be coordinated to reduce turmoil in the RCU. Although there was a consensus of opinion that CAPSTONE is working in both motivation and training, FORSCOM must publish VOL I CAPSTONE to firmly establish training priorities and reduce the number of changes.

## 9. AFFILIATION

A. AFFILIATION. The consensus was that the affiliation program is working. A marked improvement is noted in units which have a working affiliation program. Recommend continuation and expansion.

## 10. REVISED MTBSP

A. (U) BASIS FOR REVISED MTBSP. The new FORSCOM MTBSP will reflect a more realistic approach to RCU station arrival and LAD requirements. No negative dates will be assigned to RCUs. FORSCOM's goal is to publish a document that can meet all requirements.

11. VALIDATION

A. VALIDATION. RC Artillery units will not receive a nuclear validation until they have successfully completed an ARTEP.

12. DEPLOYMENT TO EUROPE

A. ADVANCE PARTY REQUIREMENTS. Although these requirements for advance party duties are set forth in USAREUR OPLAN 4360-83 (S), dtd Oct 83, concern was expressed as to whether these requirements are:

- o Valid
- o Realistic
- o Capable of being implemented by RCUs.

13. CONUSA REORGANIZATION

A. FIFTH ARMY CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT MAT FORT RILEY WHEN ARMR PHASES OUT. The MAT at Ft. Riley comprises RGFR and 1st MTC personnel. The 1st MTC makes up 50% of the MAT which will not be available when ARMR VIII phases out. SIXTH ARMY should coordinate with FIFTH ARMY to determine capability to supplement this shortfall.

B. AGR PROGRAM: AUGMENTATION TO CONUSA. Will CONUSA receive augmentation personnel in addition to the proposed reorganization TDA? There will be a number of NG/USAR AGR mobilization planners left over in the ARMR. Determine if these mobilization personnel resources will be available to enhance the designated CONUSA FORWARDS above the proposed TDA authorizations.

C. MOBILIZATION STAFF AT CONUSA. There must be an O-6/Deputy Chief of Staff type staff position to correctly interface with ARCOM, TAG's and other major headquarters. Furthermore, establishing the O6 position will permit a higher grade (O5/O4) and quality staffing at the mobilization planner/action officer level(s).

D. MOBILIZATION PLANNING AT ARCOM/STARC HEADQUARTERS. In the CONUSA reorganization plan, continued emphasis must be made to authorize and establish mobilization planning positions at each STARC/ARCOM headquarters. This is the only solution to insure that there is no degradation of past mobilization planning.

#### 14. GUIDANCE

A. GUIDANCE. Commander, ARMR VIII would like to have a meeting set up at the USAWC to discuss RC unit validation with FORSCOM (MG DOYLE) to discuss his ideas and thoughts before any new guidance is published by FORSCOM.

## LTC HUMBERSON INTERVIEWS

LTC Humberson -

We are in BG Wings office, Assistant Adjutant General, Wyoming Army National Guard. We have with us Colonel Zaysoff the 115th Field Artillery Brigade Commander. Sir, I'd like to take you back to October this year and talk a little bit about the War Gaming Center's exercise, done by Ketron, regarding mobilization, in which you were a participant. You have a list of the issues that fell out of that exercise. I would direct our attention to issue 3A, which has to do with the expansion of mobilization station capabilities to house and train incoming reserve component units. As a reflective thought, considering those shortages do exist at Fort Carson, Colorado, for both annual training and mobilization, what would you see as an optimum solution to answering that shortfall?

BG Wing -

Well, in reviewing the after action report for the mobilization exercise, 1976, this has been a problem area, and that is shortages of housing facilities and training area to meet the need of troops designated for mobilization at Fort Carson. It appears to me that we have two options, somehow, some way, we expand the facilities at Fort Carson to meet the need, or look for other areas. I believe that looking at other training areas in the region makes sense, and I have felt that way for several years. This has been done in other areas. For example, Gowen Field in Idaho; Camp Ripley in Minnesota. They've been designated as mobilization sites, and I think, a critical need can be met if we

designate areas such as Camp Guernsey or Camp Williams or both for this particular region as sub-mobilization sites. The facilities are there. Facilities are being used practically year around, so it makes sense to me that in the event of mobilization it would help expedite things and accommodate the amount of troops. It's very obvious all these people can't go into Fort Carson and be accommodated based on the schedule that's required.

LTC Humberson -

Okay, with that in mind, COL Zaysoff, being a brigade commander what I'd like for you to do, if you will, is to consider the worst case scenario under your capstone alignments. Could you mobilize your brigade under the worst case situation at Guernsey? House them, feed them, and train them there?

COL Zaysoff -

Worst case, you're talking Pacific contingencies which we'd have 4 Bns and a brigade headquarters. Camp Guernsey could take care of that amount of troops.

LTC Humberson -

It's my understanding that you are in the process of trying to acquire some additional land for range capabilities and for maneuver area, which would also expand. What exist now is what? About 30,000 acres, something like that?

COL Zaysoff -

Yes, around 30,000 I believe. The additional land would definitely help, plus it would let us increase the impact area, we'd like to have a little bit bigger impact area for artillery. Other than that, that's probably the finest range around this area for artillery.

LTC Humberson -

Along these lines, say Guernsey was established as a mob/sub-mob site so Wyoming units and their capstone alignments could mobilize there, could we expect those units to arrive at Guernsey in a more expeditious manner than they would if they were ordered all the way into Carson? The units that you have in the brigade?

COL Zaysoff -

Definitely. I think getting into Guernsey is a lot easier than trying to get all that equipment into Fort Carson. Camp Guernsey has a railhead there. It was used extensively with coal going through a couple of years back. All the highways are good coming into Guernsey - four lanes, except for about I think 16 miles getting into Guernsey. You go into Fort Carson with the amount of traffic going through Denver, and that big metropolis there, I think you have a lot of problems, where you wouldn't coming to Guernsey.

BG Wing -

I would agree, I think it would speed things up, I think it would expedite mobilization and in fact, we mobilize about once a year when we plan and prepare and move units into Guernsey, not just from our state, but other states are also using Guernsey as a training site. They have to plan, they have to move just like they would in the event of mobilization.

COL Zaysoff -

This year for example, we're bringing three battalions and brigades to Guernsey for AT84, the three battalions that are capstone.

LTC Humberson -

Basically you'll be very close to your worst case capstone alignment.

COL Zaysoff -

Yes.

LTC Humberson -

So, what we're talking about when you say we're doing that for an annual training situation really it flows into my next question; that is, can the state support this with the existing personnel that you have on board, that run the site, and can the state handle a mob site without additional manning; In your estimation at this time?

BG Wing -

I would answer in the affirmative to that, and it could be done in one of two ways. You'd have to consider first in the event of the mobilization, would STARC be mobilized for a period time. Conceptually, they probably would be mobilized, that's their mission, to help with the mobilization of our units, and once that's accomplished, probably would be deactivated. So, I definitely feel we could meet that mission.

If the STARC was not mobilized, you still have corps of people. You have your state headquarters, you have your technician force, you have your site people, these people could be used to mobilize, to operate the installation, and do the various things that would be required. In my opinion, it would be best to have the STARC mobilized for a period of time, whenever it was necessary to mobilize the units, to provide the support while they're at that sub-mobilization training station, and then to deactivate.

LTC Humberson -

Unless there were follow-on requirements leading toward a total mobilization situation.

BG Wing -

(That's right.)

COL Zaysoff -

Right now, the way Guernsey's set up, we might run, five--six camps every year, and we're doing that! We're providing bullets, beans, all of the facilities, so there wouldn't be any difference if you went there for two weeks, or you went there for two, three months, we have the personnel on board to handle it right now.

BG Wing -

That's right. It would take some planning because there would be priority requirements for units going in there in the event of a mobilization, certain things that would need to be accomplished. One would be contact and communication with the mobilization site, unless Camp Guernsey were designated a full mobilization site, a stand alone site.

LTC Humberson -

That's not completely out of reason, in that they get most of their support through Fort Warren for subsistence and they deal directly with Carson. If they were a stand-alone, they could go directly to Pueblo for ammo, so, that's not completely out of the question. It probably would be better in terms of support for validation teams, whatever would be required for mobilization, if there was some support from Carson.

COL Zaysoff -

And don't forget, the USP and FO warehouse is there and the combined support maintenance shop is there.

BG Wing -

The other thing, there just isn't any way that all units can be mobilized within that window, and be trained and supported at Carson. So, it appears that this would expedite even if units would go in there



and say be there for two or three weeks of the initial mobilization and then move on. It'd be better if they didn't have to do that, but that's certainly a solution to the glaring problem that we have.

LTC Humberson -

Well, one advantage that I see is it's a tremendous maneuver area. You could go ahead and conduct some post-mob training there if you had your equipment. In reality most of the equipment is already going to be headed for ports of embarkation, whether you go to the mob station or into a place like Guernsey anyway. That stuff's going to be gone. So whatever training you do is somewhat suspect as far as I'm concerned, unless they've got the equipment on site to do it. And as you were discussing earlier Colonel Zaysoff, the worst case situation would be a non-European scenario or Fourth Mech moves and there's nothing in Carson anyway. There's no equipment there at all, and probably your units would be in the same shape, the stuff's already shipped right?

COL Zaysoff -

(That's what they tell us.)

LTC Humberson -

In terms of the Guernsey area, I understand that you're in the process of building a new armory there that has a dispensary in it, what about the ability of the surrounding community to handle an influx for mobilization, especially in terms of medical?

COL Zaysoff -

Well, within 30 miles either way, east or west, you've got a location that has a hospital, Wheatland, to the west, Torrington, to the east, there's Emergency Evac procedures are worked out with both hospitals where you can Huey troops in if they get hurt.

LTC Humberson -

Also, what would be the flight time in an emergency situation, Medivac, into Fitzsimmons? You have that capability also.

BG Wing -

You're talking about one plus 15 into Fitzsimmons.

LTC Humberson -

So you've got a good Army hospital within a very near distance?

BG Wing -

(Right.) And I don't know what the probability of using Francis E. Warren Air Force Base. In an emergency situation, there's a new hospital, complete medical facilities, but related to that question, it would be where would we get the medical support, the doctors, the medical detachment that would operate the dispensary, the facilities at Camp Guernsey? They'd either have to be mobilized or we have a few personnel in the STARC. And then unit personnel that would be coming into Guernsey.

LTC Humberson -

Well, in your brigade you'd have a brigade surgeon that would be coming in with the brigade, right?

COL Zaysoff -

With a medical section. That's right.

LTC Humberson -

So, there would be those medical personnel and there is a state surgeon in the STARC, if it were mobilized he would be available. In terms of air assets, I guess if Wyoming units were mobilizing, 1022nd actually could be traced for Wyoming to mobilize right there at Guernsey, right? There's an airfield there.

BG Wing -

Yes, they could mobilize there, and then you've got an air ambulance capability. There'd be a number of requirements in the event of mobilization, and other than emergencies that would be required, you know, that first couple three weeks updating physical shots, many of these things that could be done, could be done right there at Guernsey with the organic medical people and perhaps support from STARC.

LTC Humberson -

Of the other issues, sir, on the issue sheet, outside of the 3A there, which of those do you think could be solved with a change in policy or at last at minimum cost? Of all of those issues, are there certain ones there that you have that could be handled without megabucks being spent to correct the short-fall? For example, I noticed one in the area of personnel, the identification of critical people in the mobilization structure, for example, and I'm referring to guys like that are at Fort Carson who are reservists and would be mobilized with a unit and yet they are supposed to be the mobilization planners and are supposed to be the guys that are supposed to be the mobilization planners that are supposed to be there when we mobilize into that mob station and they are mobilized and gone. And I think you discussed that somewhat at that exercise. What's your feeling on that in terms of critical personnel? Can they be identified and put into some kind of mobilization status if they're working that field where they are available or not?

BG Wing -

Well, this idea was kicked around back there and that would be if the mobilization personnel are shipped out, then someone has to be

designated to take over the mob site to provide the support and services, one possibility would be to use the ARCOM, and have them plan to come in and to provide these services and support. I guess another possibility and perhaps this should be explored, would be to look at some of the STARC's and the people who are working in mobilization planning and so on as a backup.

LTC Humberson -

And they are there. And then mobilization would be mobilized with the STARC and we continue functioning.

BG Wing -

That's right. So I think both of those ideas should be considered and explored because that could well happen.

LTC Humberson -

Based on your experience at the war game itself and the seminar, I'd like to get from you some reflective thoughts in regards to format and whether or not you think exercises like this from something like the War College is beneficial, or is it an experience that can be just as well duplicated back here with your STARC, if I can get your feelings on that?

BG Wing -

Well, I thought it was well planned, well organized, and I personally benefited and I think that there will be some follow-up in our STARC and in 6th Army as a matter of fact, based on what we did at Carlisle Barracks in October, and I think taking the various situations that were developed and then using these right your STARC or STARC exercise, we're going to use it for an army exercise later this spring. I think there'll be some very positive fallout. And the way this was developed and the planning and thinking that went into it, it can be used a number of

times, so from that standpoint I thought it was very worthwhile. I think the jury is still out on the benefits, and that is, what's going to be the follow-up, how are we going to attack some of the problems and various situations that were identified and we recognized these, now how do we come up with the solutions and meet the needs of mobilization?

LTC Humberson -

Of course, this is part of our study group's charter. We're out kind of following up on these issues, reminding people of what came out as an issue and maybe to develop alternative solutions.

BG Wing -

I think back to your original question, could it be done at the STARC? Well, yes, we've been doing mobilization exercises, we've been exercising the STARC headquarters, but I think this is more complex, more realistic, and a lot more thought and planning went into this that we can use and should use.

LTC Humberson -

How do you feel about the ability to sit there and talk to the guy that is representing FEMA, and the guy that's the mob station? Do you feel that exchange with people sitting right there all in the same room is valuable?

BG Wing -

Yes. Representatives from FORSCOM and the opportunity to point out okay, you've indicated this in your guidance, here are some problems and to be able to say here are the problems, and I notice that some of that dialogue was very productive, and also to have General Arter sitting right there to see the total picture, and he mentioned that he would be

doing some follow-up concerning some of these various problem areas. I thought that was most beneficial to have representatives from the active, from the guard, from FORSCOM, from FEMA, all those agencies.

LTC Humberson -

Colonel Zaysoff and General Wing, is there anything that you would like to add to our discussion here that you think would benefit our study and what we're trying to follow-up here on these issues, and to try to come up with an alternative solution to at least that one issue, expansion of mobilization station. Is there anything that you would like to add in here that we haven't touched?

COL Zaysoff -

I don't think we touched the fact that there's going to be an air strip, probably finished in Guernsey by the end of this summer (1984) that will take care of C-130's.

LTC Humberson -

So there would be C-130 access to the Guernsey area. In addition to that, not too far away, there's a commercial airport too if required.

COL Zaysoff -

There's one in Torrington, there's one in Wheatland, one in Douglass, and Scott's Bluff will take a fairly big aircraft.

LTC Humberson -

So that air transport personnel supplies and this sort of thing is good. You mentioned that there's the highway net going in there is very good and I believe that the rail facilities there are tremendous with the amount of coal that comes down through there and the size of the switching area that I think they have there. So in terms of access to the area, it is accessible.

BG Wing -

I would just say this. The recommendation that came from one of the mobilization representatives from Carson I thought was very pertinent to this problem, and he indicated that probably the first step should be to designate some sub-mobilization stations for the short term, and that makes sense, because as I said in my opening remarks, every mobilization exercise has indicated that there's a short-fall in facilities, training areas and so on. This seems to be the most feasible thing to do, so let's designate some sub-mobilization sites, plan to use them for a designated amount of time, or whatever it takes, and then move forward. It seems very clear to me that it's workable, it's functional and it will enhance the entire mobilization process.

LTC Humberson -

Okay, I thank you very much for your time.

We're with General Spence, the Adjutant General of Wyoming, and General Wing, the Assistant Adjutant General Army for Wyoming, General Wing was a participant in the original seminar. General Spence, one of the issues that fell out of the seminar at Carlisle was the fact that Fort Carson has a shortage in housing, and in terms of training areas for all of the incoming reserve component units under mobilization scenario. From that issue we are trying to find alternatives to satisfy that problem, and our question to you would be in your view, and from your perspective, would you consider Guernsey a good solution to help fill that short-fall in terms of mobilizing Wyoming units and their capstone traces?

MG Spence -

You bet it would! For the past eight years, I have been proposing to 6th Army, I've been proposing to people from the Pentagon that Guernsey was an excellent spot as the sub-mob station because I do not believe that Carson can at the present time, or will be able to handle everything that could be thrown at them with complete mobilization. In fact, the training areas are not completely adequate for that amount of people coming in, and I don't believe the equipment will be there that we will be able to train on, so therefore I think as a sub-mob station that we could move unilateral units plus capstone into Guernsey. We could take care of all those things that have to be taken care of the same as they could at Carson. We could house them, we could train them, with very little additions up there, maybe some heating plants for cold weather, we could do it in the winter time, spring, fall, or summer.

LTC Humberson -

Of course, Fort Carson finds themselves in that same condition under a winter scenario, they don't have winterized facilities, and basically I think it fell out that reserve component units could plan on living in tent cities, is that not right, General Wing?

General Wing -

Right.

LTC Humberson -

So, we're basically at the same point. There are, I would say, at Guernsey some 2,000 plus existing billets, and with tent cities could very well accommodate your units.

MG Spence -

Yes, and those existing buildings are being heated in a very low cost and provide for winter training.



LTC Humberson -

You just built a new armory in the Guernsey area. Or in the process of building it, and when that's there, under mobilization conditions, I would assume, if it was winter time, you could house people in there to keep them out of the cold.

MG Spence -

Oh, we most certainly could. We could house at least 200 or 300 troops there, and not only that, we have the dispensary facilities that are pretty adequate for a great many troops.

LTC Humberson -

In terms of access to the area, there's railroad, and as I understand it, the airport will be functional for at least C-130's by this coming July, once the extension you're putting on there is finished. Is that correct for a combat assault strip.

MG Spence -

You're very much right. We have transportation, and there of course is the major railroad, one of the largest in the world the Burlington. Also, the airstrip you're talking about is already approved for H Model C-130's.

So they can go in there now.

They can go in there now, and when training requires that they use unapproved airstrips and we will have this airstrip, which is now about 5200 feet, we will have about 5400 feet, hopefully with turn-arounds this summer sometime. So yes, we're looking forward to at least C-130's, and right now the H models, hopefully the B models, and the E models, or whatever in the very near future.

So the highway net going in there is adequate. You've got four lanes up until about 16-20 miles out from Guernsey itself.

MG Spence -

16 to 20 miles from Guernsey, let's see, Interstate I-25, so as far as transportation in and out, we have plenty.

LTC Humberson -

Ground, air, rail, all of those things are accessible.

MG Spence -

"Right."

LTC Humberson -

You have bunker storage at Guernsey that would house ammunition in the event that mobilization stockpiles were designated and put in there?

MG Spence -

Yes, in fact we have one of the better ammunition storage areas in the country. It's large enough to handle all the troops that would be able to come into Guernsey, Infantry, Armor, artillery, whatever.

LTC Humberson -

I guess what we're talking about is an optimum size then for the post, probably of about a brigade headquarters and maybe four battalions, mobilizing in there under the worst case scenario.

MG Spence -

We can handle that.

LTC Humberson -

I understand that you are in the process of attempting to acquire additional land in addition to the 30,000 plus acres you have now which will even make it a more attractive artillery range for what we're talking about?

MG Spence -

Increase the maneuver area and add a couple of battalions to the list.

LTC Humberson -

You've had a chance to look at some of the issues that fell out of the seminar game that we're looking at. Are there any of those that you'd like to address, or that you would like to have us look at in more detail in addition to the item of expansion of mobilization station capability?

MG Spence -

Well, I think that if we were allowed to mobilize the state of Wyoming and the capstone units at Guernsey we can eliminate a lot of problems that Fort Carson would have. We could do it in less time, and we could provide those things for families that's necessary. We could talk about administration support. I think we're fully capable of a lot of the administration that's needed.

Some people maybe question that, but we do that administration from day to day, and day to day, and don't seem to have too much problem. We also train on the military the Army's way of administration, so I certainly think that we can handle that in good shape. I'm not to sure that maybe we couldn't give our ARTEPS then if we were allowed to keep our equipment and certainly we could ship our equipment out of there just as easy as going to Fort carson and shipping it. Or we could also gather them there, ship them out of there rather than from the home station. At the right time we could ship them about the time we were moving to Fort Carson or wherever they might want to send them, to the port or whatever.

LTC Humberson -

In that regard, in terms of validation, that's one of the things you talked about General Wing at the seminar, was the fact that while units are undergoing ARTEPS, that are written by the active army, that are administered basically under their supervision, their evaluations on the regular AT, that if we were mobilized then there would have to be another ARTEP Force validation. My question to both of you would be that with the senior Army advisor here in the state, and your existing STARC, and the other advisor personnel, I think you have a brigade advisor, and an IG assigned now, is there any reason that the validation, there would be no problem with doing validation right at Guernsey, upon mobilization, would there?

MG Spence -

I'll say this. When we mobilize our people would be on the same status as any other regular army personnel, and we do have the talent and we have the knowledge and we can give the ARTEPS. We have the specialists that are needed, we have them all. We do that every year in some form or another. So there's no reason why we can't do the same thing as our total force brothers.

BG Wing -

Now along those lines I think we need to look at the present system of evaluation, and it's being implied that it's not a credible program, and if it isn't let's do something about it before mobilization. I believe it is credible. I think the ARTEP and our training evaluation instruments have improved, but what they're saying, or what was said at the mobilization exercise that these things don't count. If you're receiving the C-1 rating or a C-2, we're not sure that that's a valid

rating. Until you're mobilized and someone else administers a validation test, and also the question that came up at the exercise, if I agree with what General Spence said, we can do it, we can administer the training instrument providing, you know, we have the equipment and the ammunition and everything there. If they want to, you know, send a team from Carson, a team from Carson can be there in 40 minutes, or 45 minutes, for a day and observe.

MG Spence -

Along that line that Charlie's talking about, and I probably have maybe a little advanced information that I haven't got to him about, maybe I have, I'm not sure. There was General Tyson and I, I guess probably the first to talk about this to the 6th Army commander in a conference down there as to the l-R system of evaluation at summer camps. The l-R system is an evaluation that goes to 6th Army and FORSCOM. but does not and can give them some idea on what training we need. But this is not validated to the point it's accepted by the Joint Chiefs, Department of Army. But IG's are, and what we felt, and what I think was brought up in one of our conferences in Washington not very long ago, that instead of having the evaluations of l-R for the l-R evaluation teams that one year we have an IG, which is validated and sent to Washington.

LTC Humberson -

To the Joint Chiefs?

MG Spence -

Yes. They go to the top dog, so to speak, and then the next year an ARTEP. Now, this would mean that the administration would be more real than the IG's we have now, because the IG's we have now are doing nothing but testing our technicians. At summer camp they would be

testing all facets of administration, weekenders, M-day soldiers, that are working at summer camp that will be the people that will support us in combat. So therefore, they will get a more realistic view of what we are in readiness on the administration and support to the units in the field, and they can do that without interfering with the training going on. And again, lets ARTEP, the next year, ARTEP is a valid evaluation that says you are ready or you're not ready, okay? And yet the l-R's go out and say well these are weak areas and we look at them, and then next year we change our training programs, and we look at the individual soldiers tasks and we look at the NCO development, but we really are not doing anything to say this unit is ready or not ready. Again, we feel, and I'm sure you're going to see some of this in the future, IG in the field, ARTEP every other year - IG one year, ARTEP the next year.

BG Wing -

"And it counts!"

MG Spence -

And it counts, and do away with the l-R's they use, and these being used by 6th Army and FORSCOM.

LTC Humberson -

And would do away with the supposed validation under a mobilization, because if we get down for real every other year by the IG, so if you're mobilized and you're rated as a one rating, and you've got a go, you're good to go from there, right?

MG Spence -

Your right.

BG Wing -

Evidently, it would provide more acceptable information.

MG Spence -

And our ARTEPS have to be brought up to regular Army standards on time, personnel, etc. We want it the way it is, so that when we take the ARTEP, they say yes, you are ready for combat, or no, you are not, you have the validation of being ready and we know where to go. These are the things that I think could be done now and then those things that aren't done could be done at Camp Guernsey in a sub-mobilization station. I feel very strong in saying that the mobilization CPX that we've been involved in, we have not been shown anything that would indicate that Fort Carson could handle our people or the people here that hasn't been given to us. We don't know, and it seems like every year we go through the mobilization CPX, from region, Carson or wherever they come from, and every year it's the same thing, same thing over and over, and then there's some new people come in and we start all over again and the same mistake is made time and time again. Mobilization is a yearly deal for the Guard. We mobilize every year. With the addition of those things we need to do, for instance, upon a realistic mobilization, those things that we have to do for family services, personal affairs for people, we have to do that.

LTC Humberson -

But presently, as structured, your STARC has the various sections that can pretty well take care of the family service type things. You have JAG services, you've got medical personnel service, everything you need in STARC.

MG Spence -

And right now in our training we contact units, we contact people, contact families and give instructions now. Upon mobilization all we

have to do is verify and make sure they're all taken care of, and they're going to have to do that at Fort Carson if we don't anyway.

So there are many things we can do. We can continue to train. What's going to happen? Is our equipment going to be shipped where we're going? Or are we going to pick up equipment that we haven't been trained on, or if we go to Fort Carson during the length of time we're there, no one can really say how long we're going to be there. No one can say how long it's going to be for those that's there before they ship, and if we go on the European scenario, and they feel that they're going to get out and drop on Pomcus, and I'll say it again, I'm not so sure it'll be there, and if it isn't they're going to have to ship their equipment, and if they do, what are we going to do? Sit down there waiting with no equipment, no way to train? Until such time that we're deployed? If it's a European scenario, and everything went according to Hoyle, which I've never seen a war that has, we might be able to deploy in that length of time. If it's in the other part of the world or the Mid East, the Third World as they call it, it's a different story. There is no Pomcus. So we have another problem. Are we doing everything at the station out here depending on one scenario? So we feel that those things that we could be doing, still training on our equipment, and still doing those things like teaching soldiers self survival, taking care of families and the records changing over to the Army administration method, can all be done here and then from then on we're ready.

LTC Humberson -

Okay! Sir, I thank you very much for your time. I think you've given some insights that we'll type up and make part of the study. One of the things I would ask you is we'll put together a proposal to be



submitted onto the bureau and send back to you for your signature so that when this study gets put together we can say this is one study that did accomplish something.

MG Spence -

That sounds good to me.

LTC Humberson -

General Wing, you just mentioned something in regards to the ammunition problem that fell out at the War Game. Could you share your thoughts on how ammunition could be made available for units in the event of mobilization on a year round basis?

BG Wing -

One possibility is this. Each year ammunition is allocated to all guard units to conduct annual training. Normally that is allocated and approved early in the training year and then at some point, it's shipped in and it's stored, and I would like to see this considered, is that, that training ammunition that is normally approved for the training year be stored at the training sites right at the beginning of the training year, then that ammunition is there in the event of mobilization, it could be used to conduct training, or if there isn't a mobilization, it's there for annual training, and as soon as annual training is conducted, replenish it, and then just continue to do that, and I think that would alleviate a part of the problem that there isn't any ammunition available for the conduct of training in the event of mobilization. I think that's a serious issue and needs to be considered.

MG Spence -

I like that item. I would like to get a position paper on that to take to El Paso with me this spring.

LTC Humberson -

The only consideration would be is perhaps a little more in terms of security personnel which we are required to have some on board full time anyway, and really, you're not talking a large expansion of force or any costs other than what's being done.

MG Spence -

It would be basically those that we hire in the summer time continuing through the winter.

BG Wing -

And we have a secure area. We have the storage capability, and it's in the budget by training year. It's there.

MG Spence -

It's already money that's been expended.

BG Wing -

So it's a matter of storing it and then replenishing it once it's been used for annual training early rather than late in the training year.

LTC Humberson -

Very good. Thank you for that thought. We'll capture that in our study.

## ARMR IX

Colonel Miner's office and works under the Army Readiness mobilization Region 9. Sir, you're actually at ARMR IX headquarters which is co-located in the same area with 6th Army, and in a subordinate headquarters soon to go out of business in a reorganization.

I'm the Chief of Mobilization Division within ARMR IX and soon to move over to 6th Army to be their Chief of Mobilization and Contingency Planning. I attended the DCRP at Carlisle as the 6th Army representative for mobilization.

And LTC Wright.

Raymond Wright -

I also attended the DCRP and represented the ARMR IX level play under 6th Army, with Colonel Miner. I'm a mob planner for ARMR IX.

LTC Humberson -

Okay, if I can I'll touch your memory and take you back to that seminar game at the War College, and I would like to direct your attention to the issue, Issue 3A. Considering that shortages exist in housing and training areas at Fort Carson, it was indicated that was true for annual training and mobilization. If I recall, the numbers that were talked about were something in the area of about 5,000, is that right, that basically the shortage was 5,000. Is that right?

COL Miner -

Yes, that's what I got in one of the notes.

LTC Humberson -

Considering that those shortages exist, what would you see as the optimum solution to answering that short-fall, either one.

COL Miner -

Well, obviously if they had adequate housing on every installation for the total of the RCU's going there, that would be desirable, but we all know through the resource constraints that isn't going to be possible. We might want to be sure we're talking the right figure. When you say 5,000, I'm not so sure that was agreed on, that was what was short. What that said was that they have programmed a facility for 5,000 additional people, but I don't think that would totally satisfy the requirement. I'm not sure, but that's something you'll have to get together with somebody from Carson and insure that is what it is.

Well, we knew that they had a 5,000 man RCU in the FY86 program, and that's all.

LTC Wright -

Just to show you how tentative this figure can be, what's the size, approximate size of an artillery brigade?

COL Miner -

About 3500, something like that.

LTC Humberson -

Pretty close.

LTC Wright -

That has shifted out of Carson.

COL Miner -

Yes, we transferred them from that installation there to mobilize it in an installation here within ARMR IX. So that's taken one big hunk out of there right now, you got to look at the total picture. In other

words, what do they've got mobilizing there and how soon they're going to be leaving. You've got to look at a sort of matrix. Fort Carson has got to come up with a matrix for one. Who's mobilizing, who's it for, and can we make room in the facility we're now using and then the other.

Yes, as I understand it, there are 13 field artillery battalions going into Carson, we took 3 of them out plus a brigade headquarters, so that reduced them down to 10 artillery battalions, and then I don't know what else mobilizes at Carson.

LTC Wright -

I don't see how an installation can expect to have housing for everyone that's mobilizing when mobilizing takes place only at some point in time and just for a matter of days and weeks, you can't build housing to accommodate that type of facility.

LTC Humberson -

Well, I think that that's one comment that's in that issue there that units are going to probably live in tent cities and I think all the reserve components are aware of that.

LTC Wright -

And in ARMR IX we have about 6 mob stations and housing ranges from post can accommodate everyone to a post that can accommodate very few and they all go out to the field for the test. So you'll have every conceivable size represented.

LTC Humberson -

Considering that these shortages exist, and that people are concerned with them, let me ask you this. Would you consider the utilization of state owned facilities? In other words, there are National Guard camps

and training bases, maneuver areas available in existence that could be utilized. Would you see that as a potential alternative solution to the question here that's surfaced?

LTC Wright -

No, I don't. First of all, I don't think it's a problem. I think that Colonel Miner if you want to answer these questions, please.

I don't think there's a problem here because if they're going to live in tents, they're going to live in tents. This is a field situation that's getting ready for war, and that's part of war. So it's not really a problem. It just may be an inconvenience. It could be a problem if the weather is bad. You know, it's a mountain state, and you're in the middle of a blizzard, that's a problem, and that's where you're going to have to make some adjustment, but otherwise that's not a problem, and to force you to orient away from these major installations and have all the capabilities and facilities to bring RC units on board, activate them into the active, train them under competent people and do everything that's supposed to take place, you have to do it at these mob stations. We do not have the people to allow the units to start going out to a lot of other places and do the housing and the training part. If the training is acceptable, if the training areas are acceptable and for the most part I think they are, then you're forced just by a constraint of so many active bodies to control that type of situation. You're forced into a quote active mob station role with very few outside. . . .

COL Miner -

I can agree with generally I agree with what he's saying because it leads to direct deployment if you want to modify direct deployment and I

don't think that the actives are capable of doing that. Now, if you're talking about creating another Attebury and a Roberts and Gowen Field and that sort of thing, yeah. If that can be done, if it can be resourced, then, you know, there's nothing wrong with that. The problem is you need to have a mob station that's capable of bringing those units into the active role. You can't piecemeal it. In other words, you've got to have a complete organization to do it. You can't say well I'll do part of them over here and part at Liggett, part of them at Roberts, part of them at San Luisobispo, part at Hamilton Field. You can't do that. It's got to be under (1) just one control, and it's got to have the resources to do it, and that's where we run into problems, and that's how these national guard ISU's we're coming up with, like Roberts and Gowen Field. Gowen Field is already in being, right now, there's still a little problem with resources. If decided you're going to do it, it's up to the Bureau now to say okay, yeah, here's your space allocation, you're going to go and get them. But I can tell you right now they can't go hire all these people immediately and be ready to do it. It's a thing that's got to go up. So in line with that, that's where we think it falls.

LTC Humberson -

So basically what you're saying is yes, it would be a potential solution if it would be a stand-alone mob station, in other words, expanding the maneuver area or something, but that we shouldn't look in terms of sub-mob stations.

COL Miner -

That's right.

LTC Humberson -

Under Carson, for example.

LTC Wright -

And even a stand-alone mob station is going to have problems because we're not sure it can be easily resolved because we have tasked active installations, we helped them come up to speed at the same time they're coming up to speed for mobilization.

COL Miner -

Everyone of those ISU's have a major installation, must provide start-up support, is what it's classified as, it's called start-up support, mostly ADP, finance, personnel, engineers, some logisticians, and we can task them up to 120 days.

LTC Wright -

And even these installations express doubt on doing their mission and the start-up mission. They're uneasy with that.

COL Miner -

Well, the big part of the problem is the data link equipment, most of it. Say, for example, ADP. Fort Lewis is tasked to support Gowen Field for start-up. They don't have a "data link" between the two of them to provide transfer of both, information data out of one computer system to their computer system. It's got to be hand-carried by courier in card form to run down to that installation and have them plug it into the computer. So there are some problems even doing ISU.

LTC Humberson -

In terms of that, heaven forbid, I liked your ideas in regard to the STARC mission in each state once mobilization happens. In other words, I guess what I'm saying is for example at Gowen. Does the Idaho STARC and have a responsibility for helping to run that, is that part of that STARC's charter? And would that alleviate some of the short-falls that you're identifying in terms of personnel staffing of the ISU.



COL Miner -

Well, no, the ISU, let's get it straight. First, they have to have a pre-mob TDA, day to day operations of Gowen Field. On mobilization they must use those same people, the pre-mob TDA, plus a full-mob TDA. These are part-timers that is a part of the STARC and then they must have the capability to run that installation. Now to the fullest extent, training, readiness, mobilization, the whole bit, deployment, that TDA has to be capable of doing that.

Just like any active installation.

The only thing is there are some short-falls which we talked about, start-up costs and resources that had to be provided by an active installation. The STARC can't do that right now, but they would plug that into the system.

LTC Humberson -

So that what you're saying is the STARC has a direct link with that operation, that's part of their mission.

COL Miner -

Okay, understand that STARC, when that happens, is now a federal agency. They're federal troops. The TAG is now separate.

LTC Humberson -

That's right, and the STARC is a federal entity that exists there for that purpose.

COL Miner -

Well, it's a FORSCOM mob station at that point in time.

LTC Wright -

That's an add-on mission. That's an add-on mission that's peculiar to the STARC in California. The STARC mission per se is relatively the

same in each state, and those that have these add-on installations have additional roles so they have additional requirements, additional people.

COL Miner -

The main mission of the STARC as well as the MUSARC is to get those guys from home station to mob station, and that's their critical mission, and of course, like he said, these other states, these 8 other states that are picked up, ISU's, that's a bigger mission. Of course, they're being resourced to do that too.

LTC Humberson -

And as you indicated if you were to come up with other ISU's or a stand-alone installation, you'd have the resource.

COL Miner -

That's the hang of the problem.

LTC Humberson -

Thinking back to the seminar and considering the same topic, from your perspective here with ARMIR IX, and from your level, do you see this as a unique thing or is this something that should be looked at in all connections, this mobilization thing, and the fact that there is a short-fall at most mob stations, or do you think that that's peculiar to the one area.

Is it something that goes across the board or not?

COL Miner -

I'm not sure of what you're asking.

LTC Humberson -

I'm asking, when we identified that, there was a short-fall at Fort Carson, housing and training area. Is that peculiar to that one place

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
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or is that, pretty well, is that an issue that runs pretty well across the board, across the Army.

LTC Wright -

It's peculiar, but it could run across. . . .

COL Miner -

I'd say it's a little bit different. Everyone of them is a little different, just like we moved the 40th Division from Irwin. They had tremendous training areas, but they had no damn billets. You know, so when the combination of trying to get the whole division together so they could have a command and control that could satisfy the division commander and he could train and prepare the whole division, we found out Roberts had all the housing, World War II housing, but at least they had walls and roof and that sort of thing and they could accommodate them, so we decided that would be a better place for them. Now, where are we going to get training areas? Well, we got some training areas at Roberts for a lot of things, but it doesn't satisfy a division requirements, so we're using Hunter-Liggett which is not far away, and they can use that for training. Now that's unique. Fort Lewis has got Yakama. Instead of mobilizing the 81st Brigade at Lewis, propose they mobilize it at Yakama because Yakama has more training areas. But they're all a little unique in their own way. I would wager that housing in almost all cases, and Roberts is obviously an exception, is a short-fall. The big problem is where you going to put them up, how are you going to put them up? They're going to be put up in pup tents. The Army doesn't have tents to support a brigade or anything in the field. They just don't have this.

LTC Humberson -

I guess an add-on, or follow-on with that, is if you were at the exercise, do you feel that an exercise of this nature would be beneficial now that the ARMRS's are going to conduct, say, at the CONUSA level develop a list of problems that were common across the board and at least share information to CONUSA as to how they're solving certain problems. Do you think that the seminar in this kind of format is useful, or would be useful for that?

LTC Wright -

I think it's more beneficial as a teaching exercise to acquaint even experts with how it's going to function and what problems you're going to encounter as a mode to hone in on a particular problem. I'm not sure it will accomplish as big of an advantage as it will just teaching everybody that's in the business a little more or realistically of how it's going to happen, but there's a lot of people out there think they know mobilization and they really don't, and this sort of an exercise gives you a pretty quick and dirty look at it. I've been in it for a year or two or three at different levels, and we got problems. So guys that are just into it think they know what it's all about to go through this will be a real training, valuable training lesson. As far as citing problem areas, sure, it's going to happen, but I don't know whether that's its value.

COL Miner -

Just to pick this as an example, this right here, what's going to happen to the issue that came out of this.

Probably nothing per se, because it's just not at the right level, you know. If you're going to do something like this, and you want

results, then you've got to do it at DA level, even above FORSCOM. If you had a seminar at FORSCOM level and you had the right players there, the decision makers plus the staff, you might be able to get some of these things resolved, but some of these are bigger, much bigger than that, you know, like this one right here, the NCA problem. That's way beyond anybody that's sitting here doing anything about it.

LTC Humberson -

Considering the format and what you're saying here, I guess to just kind of capsulize it, you would see it as a good training device for mob planners, across the mobilization spectrum, whatever structure they come from?

LTC Wright -

Colonel Miner made this mandatory reading on the whole exercise, for every mob planner in ARMR IX just to better educate them and then when we actually went through it at the school, it was even more beneficial.

COL Miner -

Let me give you what we're going to do in 6th Army and then you'll get an idea of what's going to happen, when I move over to 6th Army next week, our plan is to - we're going to run a little mini exercise in May. We're going to train the staff on how to mobilize and what their functions are ahead of that exercise. We're going to test it during that exercise, get some SOP's written, mob TDA's written, that sort of thing. And then after AT, back in August-September time frame we're going to hold a TCRP, 6th Army wide, involve all the commanders of the MUSARC's, the STARC's, the mob stations, of General Arter and his complete staff with the staff doing the briefing, bringing up those issues

that they feel are critical in their staff arena and that which the MUSARC and STARC and mob station commanders must be aware of. We'll use that as a teaching vehicle, for them, plus an exchange of information for us, the staff, because we're going to learn something because just like he was saying, sitting up on that to hear the ARCOM commanders ARMR VIII talk and the mob station people how they look at things as opposed to how the guys over here looked at things, totally different perspective, not totally, but there's some difference in perspective. And so it was an advantage for us to be there and learn that part, we hope the same thing is going to happen and I can see that it will. It's pretty obvious we're going to gain something out of that type of conference. And then that will be the stage for everybody to go back. They're now thinking mobilization and deployment issues and problems, they now understand enough that when we run MOBEX's in the fall, MOBEX 85, Powder River, then those guys will be full participants and they'll be able to understand what's going on.

So that tells you how we feel about the program. We think the program's got a lot of value, but as he said, it's a teaching vehicle, not a problem solver.

LTC Humberson -

Let me loop back and just put an add-on and add a question to this. Could you see it as a problem solver if there were a tasker there that when an issue surfaced that, that tasker could look at it and say it's somebody from DCSOPS or DCSPER or whatever, from DA, could sit there and say well, 6th Army that appears to be an issue that you should address. Will you follow up on that issue, or start the matter. You know, that kind of falls within your home area, which would then become a problem solving thing, could you see that?



COL Miner -

Well, whatever you want to make of it. It depends on the commander of course, but we, you know, we would expect there are some issues that come out, that are solvable within 6th Army area, that we in DCSOPS would task the appropriate agency to resolve those issues.

Most of the issues that are going to come up, that are probably unsolvable are already issues in all sorts of programs, the RAP at DA level, the FAMDIP at FORSCOM level. Most of them I don't think are going to come up with any new ones per se. It's just going to be a better understanding of the problem of how we can work around them until the big boys decide. That's why he and I think there's really no problem solving issue coming out of it.

LTC Wright -

Maybe a training solver.

COL Miner -

Yes, and it's a recognition of a problem, a recognition of issues.

LTC Humberson -

Of those issues that came out of that thing, and you have a list of them there, are there any there that you think can be addressed at minimum cost or would simply a change in policy, and they were considering the entire list.

COL Miner -

Well, the STARC missions, for example, like family assistance and movement control, I think people are addressing those, but I think, you know, it's a resource problem. I don't blame NGB. If I was at NGB I wouldn't say I'll take care of MOBCON for you. Because hell no, it's going to cost them people, it's going to cost them money to do that.

LTC Wright -

Let me ask Colonel Miner a question that may be of interest to you. Of these issues, how many are new to you?

COL Miner -

I'm not sure there are any.

LTC Wright -

I know them all. So as far as surfacing problems and new issues, it could happen, but I wouldn't expect it to be of real value.

COL Miner -

I'm not sure. Let's see, the availability of Pure. Communications, again, that's a big one, for STARCS and for MUSARC's between the mob stations and the headquarters and all that, but again, it's been on the books now since 1980. And it's still not in the near future that we can get our hands on.

LTC Humberson -

If I can direct your attention to the one on ammunition. One idea that we picked up on this trip. One of the interviewees that I talked to said to me, why, don't we, in the area of ammunition, you know, we say that that's an issue, that ammunition is not available for mobilization training, or post-mob training. Why don't we take the ammunition that is under CTA that is authorized, paid for, and already taken care of dollar-wise for annual training, and store that, instead of at the depots or wherever it's at, you know, normally it should be in in May and then they go to AT, why don't we at the very beginning of the year go ahead and put that stuff out for storage at the mob station so that if a mobilization occurs between now and whenever that AT would occur that, that ammunition would at least be there for the purpose of conducting an ARTEP or validation or whatever. So I responded in that

probably the big constraint would be in terms of storage space because we're already talking dollar resource when that's going to happen. Considering that one constraint, what's your reaction to that as far as policy change? And would it move us any closer to solving or addressing that problem? Do you see this as realistic?

COL Miner -

I think it's got value to be studied, you know. On the surface it looks all right to me. Again, my first reaction when you said it was that I'm sure the scheduling of that training ammunition going into the installation is based on when those units train there, and so that minimizes the storage problem. Now if you put it all there at the beginning of AT for the total AT period, you probably can't store it. So that becomes a resource problem.

Maybe that isn't so bad, I don't know.

LTC Wright -

The installation has to rotate that stuff too, and so you're probably going to have to require additional people to handle that additional load.

COL Miner -

But if it's put in there only on an, every year on an AT basis that essentially solves the rotation. Probably should.

LTC Humberson -

I would think that would solve the rotation problem. In other words, the unit's going to come in to do their annual training, burn that up and then it would be replaced with the following fiscal year ammunition allocation. We would be there and I guess we're saying is. . . .

LTC Wright -

But if that ammunition's already on hand and stocked at the depot, it can be delivered to the mob station within a matter of days, I would think to satisfy the same problem. By the time the units get to the mob station the ammo should be at the mob station.

COL Miner -

Of course, it's timing on when they do it. It seems to me that it could be solved either way, depending how far the depot is from the mob station, what we're going through.

LTC Wright -

The only way I can see a real advantage to that would be for early deployment.

COL Miner -

The guys have got to go out quick if they have enough ammo. But see, if we do everything right by the PMT, the Post Mobilization Training Plan, the use of this form 78R, process that properly, then they're going to know exactly, not exactly, but fairly exact figures on what the requirements are for that mob station, the training ammunition, and specifics. And training ammunition, not just for qualification familiarization but you know for any live fire exercises if they have time to do that sort of thing. And they should be, the mob station ought to be able to program that out and based on their capabilities to store could in fact do that, would have to. To have a policy change I think that would be a mob station commander's decision rather than a FORSCOM you will do it or DA you will do it kind of thing, don't you think.

LTC Wright -

I would think that could be just a calling for type of request.

The problem with leaving it at the depot is if there's any other kind of activity going on, you know, nuclear lay down or have had any other problems that would interfere with movement, depot to the mob station, that would be a consideration. There's advantages and disadvantages to doing it, but their resources would probably be the biggest problem.

LTC Humberson -

In terms of transportation? Because under mobilization you could be taxing all those resources.

COL Miner -

(Yes.)

LTC Humberson -

That's some of what we're trying to get at.

COL Miner -

But again, you'd have to go back to resource and their capability to store. Because see, what you're then requiring, you're requiring a peacetime standards for storage and upon mobilization it's not going to be that restrictive.

LTC Humberson -

Are there any other issues that you see there could be addressed? Do you know any that you're aware of, from your perspective that might be addressed through policy change or minimum cost?

All of those issues are kind of ones that require all that higher level and resource, things of that nature?

COL Miner -

Well, that Capstone one we talked about there, that's just strictly a master of FORSCOM to get their stuff together. That's just staff, it doesn't cost any resources. We're just telling them that the CONUSA, ARMR readiness group chain knows the kind of units that are good. For example, if they wanted a petroleum unit, they ought to come and ask each one of the CONUSA's what is your best petroleum unit, if you want to put it as an early deployer on RDFA or something, and then we could tell you this guys really truly, no matter what the USR says, this guy's really truly a C-2 unit, or it's really on its ass a C-4 unit. But they arbitrarily, not arbitrarily, that's unfair to FORSCOM staff, but subjective based on what they have available, which is very limited. You know, they look at the USR and other reports, AGI's maybe or something like that, and say this unit is good or bad, but that isn't enough. You have to get down to the people who see the unit every day, either the adviser or the readiness group people.

LTC Wright -

.... I can talk about MTBSP, we found out in following in peacetime working it as well as finding it out in here, there's a second problem, and that's simply that we've got two data bases that we're using for planning the current OMNI base data and the hard copy data and there's no policy as to.

COL Miner -

One is a working document and the other's a planning doc.

LTC Wright -

Yeah, people are reacting to both documents, and whereas Capstone could has been clearly defined that you work with the published document and the OMNI Data Base data is just there for your information. It's

just a clean-cut policy that people can react to but the MTB needs exactly the same sort of policy statement so that we quit jumping through our boots that we're currently doing. But we discovered that equally OMNI is in our day to day activities exercise.

LTC Humberson -

At Fort Carson one of the mob planners said something that would be very helpful being on that MPBSP. That a summary of changes should be published. What's your reaction?

LTC Wright -

I'm not sure I understand what you're saying.

COL Miner -

Yeah, what he's saying is just a summary of the major changes. Let's say, a major grouping of Capstone out of like an AMMO unit or something like that, but we'd feel uneasy unless we went down unit by unit.

LTC Humberson -

And worked each one.

COL Miner -

Wouldn't you think?

LTC Humberson -

From the mob station level they're looking at it and saying well, in order to work the thing we have to work the entire document, where if a summary of changes and the summary were published it would be a lot faster to work.

LTC Wright -

If there was a summary you'd have to work it back into the document anyway. You'd have to bring the document up to date, so if they published

the summary, just simply to have a pen and ink, that you'd have to go back to the old document and work it in to look at it in isolation. I wouldn't trust myself with that. What I would prefer to see on the MTBSP is either going with the hard bound as the planning document/regardless of what changes take place in between publications or abandon the hard totally and go the the data base . . . one or the other. Right now they're telling us to do both, and that's just nothing but confusing us.

LTC Humberson -

I guess basically that's being driven to become a two year document.

COL Miner -

Well, we would like to do that, but. . . .

LTC Wright -

They're looking to do that, but that ain't going to solve the problem. The problem will still be there. The problem is you've got a hard bound that gets the data. The one we've got is published, and they're talking you've got to go to the data base to get the most current data, then why do you have the hard bound? Why are you reacting to the hard bound, but yet the data base is not perfected enough to give us a true, accurate data. We're having trouble both ways.

LTC Humberson -

Like you say, one or the other, but not both.

COL Miner -

You know, that's the purpose of the data system. We should eliminate having to prepare a hard bound document. The problem of course is not everybody has the WES system available to them, so there probably has to be some sort of production, but that could be done probably at CONUSA level to get the information out. Remember that advanced party



requirements issue? I wonder if that's - anything ever fell out of that? This is where Europe, Europe said, you know, it requires 200 guys to come with the equipment to help process the equipment. Our assumption was on this end we ship the equipment, a minimal number of guys, like a guard or something, or the guy that holds the paper work on the equipment, and then the rest of the troops go by air. But Europe's concept was that they had to have people out of that unit to be there at the port of debarkation to take the equipment off and drive it away. See, their problem is yeah, they'd have the equipment there, but all these trucks that show up out of the transportation unit, there wouldn't be anybody there to drive them home. To the assembly area or something. And that needs to be clarified.

LTC Wright -

How that fell out, after we got into it and looked at it, at first it wasn't clear so we imagined it into the process, but our end result was that you preplan that advance that party that's got to pick up the trucks and you put them on the first aircraft that's going out so that when they land they take off immediately for seaport to drive vehicles away.

COL Miner -

That would be our solution, but that isn't what USAREUR Op Plan says. They think they're coming over on the boat with them. So that's something that can be cleared up. I would think easy enough. I could see that the 13-C and the mobilization staff at CONUSA, we all felt very strongly that there ought to be an O-6 in my position over there, and we were the only CONUSA that had it, but I understand that the 12 star letter which is the CONUSA commanders getting together of coming up with

a position to go to CAVOSOS that the other CONUSA's have jumped on board and they all want an O-6 as a mob planner. So we're glad to see that.

LTC Wright -

The natural tendency if you have an O-5 heading up the mobilization effort is that mobilization effort will fall down into the same grouping of O-5's and share and equal billing. Where mobilization cannot share equal billing of force development, you know, this sort of thing. Mobilization has to be first and foremost in order for it to work. If mobilization doesn't work, nothing's going to work, therefore it's got to have the emphasis that we've given it for the last couple of years, and in order to do that we just don't see any other way to do it, except keeping an O-6 and maybe even take it out and make it a separate staff.

COL Miner -

Mob plans separate Deputy Chief of Staff. In line with that is the other issue under that mobilization planning of ARCOM and STARC headquarters. FTUS models, full-time unit support model that they develop for MUSARC and ARCOM headquarters which calls for full-time manner, either active or AGR, it doesn't matter, but somebody dedicated to mobilization planning on that staff on a full-time basis, and they have not done that. They've done it for ARCOM, but they haven't done it for the functional MUSARC, such as the 351st in our area, and we could tell you right now the/weakest guys are the ones that don't have a full-time mob planner, and the strongest ones are the ones who had one the longest, and it's just got to happen somehow to get those people on board.

LTC Humberson -

The STARC's have done that.

COL Miner -

Yeah.

LTC Wright -

The STARCs are just coming on board this next year.

LTC Humberson -

The MUSARC you say is. . . . You see, it's model driven and it depends who drives the model. If it's a trainer driving the model, then the trainer gets his say, and your full-timer is going to be a trainer, a logistician or a programmer. You ought to have an Ops mob planner in there to make it work. The problem is with the 351st is that they are a TO&E, they're a deployable headquarters, although they have responsibility for mobilizing the units underneath them which may or may not be part of their capstone. But they don't have the authorization in their basic concept for going to war for a mob planner, so would have to kind of augment them with some other things. We've got some recommendations. Understand if we get any additional spaces that we would put a guy like that out at this functional MUSARC to make that work.

LTC Wright -

I'll tell you one area that has surfaced to my thinking as a problem solver. Not only in this exercise, but in a previous exercise that we were involved with, thru TRADOC and that was TBCS was the fact we've taken a resource called the USAR School and we divided them up to various elements for mobilization to help out, and on this dividing up in almost every case calls for a breakdown of the school structure and the remodeling of that structure to support that mission whether they go back to TRADOC, to some service school, or whether they go to the training divisions, to supplement their effort, or whether they just

become individual folks to a particular mission. And what has become evident is that on the installation upon mobilization there has got to be a school to teach MOS producing and MOS enhancing forces that is nonexistent, and the USAR school is a perfect organization to do that, and if/I were sitting, and I know it's a simplistic statement, if I were sitting at TRADOC headquarters as a commander of TRADOC I'd change that today and say that each USAR school or a multi-school go to these installations and their mission as a school, commanded by the Commandant and whole mission is to teach these courses to these people who are mobilized, and they're all MOS producing enhancement courses. This is a good resource that is not being fully utilized.

COL Miner -

Yeah, General Arter put down in his directive that DCST look into USAR schools because he's very much concerned about how they're going to be used. So I, you know, I think something may fall out from what they're looking in.

LTC Humberson -

You're aware that there's a new mob planner's course in line with all these guys that are getting on board. Are you involved with that at all? . . . providing instructors?

COL Miner -

No, they didn't ask us for any instructors. They pulled some guys out of the bureau, they pulled some guys out of FORSCOM and when you talk to Bill Muller, he went to the course. He can tell you. We sent an old hand to the course, Bill's been around a long time, on purpose because we wanted to be sure that you know he was checking them out on what they were saying and at the same time we sent some new people so they could get an education, and I think the overall effort was good in

what the bureau did, and I'm a little worried that it's going to go to TRADOC but with the standard that the bureau set, I think they can clean up their act a little bit as a result of the people that went to it. I think it will be valuable. It's just right now, there's very few people in the system whether it's USAR, NG, or active that are true mobilization planners. That's a fairly easy transition, but when I go out to hire an AGR, you know, the chances are you will have no mob experience other than what he learned as being a member of the Reserve unit or guard unit, but no planning, and so it's all a big education process, and I don't have any problems with that because the longer we stay in the business the more of them that will be qualified when they leave but it is a short-fall and you get a guy named Cole, you spend a long time, you know, for him to retroop at FORSCOM FORMDEPS and to read the local plan and then to go out and just interface with the people and find out their problems. That's a long process and his tour's half over you know. So the mob planning will bring him up to speed on the theoretical part of it quickly and then we can educate him on the practical part when he gets to the unit. . . . I think it's a good idea.

LTC Humberson -

Back to a question I asked earlier in terms of the value of this particular exercise, and basically you indicated that it should be used as a teaching tool. Would you see an exportable format like that beneficial for you to use for the CONUSA, where you're going to be at in terms of bringing people together. Do you feel a need for that or do you think that that's something you can do yourself?

COL Miner -

Well, I don't think you're going to be able to do it at the scale that the guys at the War College were thinking about, you know, with the

computers, the separate screens, where you can put staffs off into separate rooms, that sort of thing, I don't think the CONUSA's can do that. You know, it's just not within our resources to do it, but the concept of sitting down and running through using a scenario of sorts to direct the action and then to raise actual issues and discuss them, they can do that, and I think they can get the value that he and I were talking about, the teaching side of it. Now the problem is you're not going to get as much staff participation probably as you would in the lower staff education even as you would in a system used at Carlisle, because you know you can put them off in a separate room and put all the machines in there and let them hear what's happening and see what people are saying and then have the mechanism for them to come down to the principle and tell him what's going on and what isn't going on. I don't know, what do you think?

LTC Wright -

I agree with what you said. The only thing I'd add to it was when I first read this thing I became extremely excited about the potential as a training vehicle for everybody in the units, states, army system and then as I got more into it and more into it, I saw how closely it came in on reaching a system of doing things and it came less valuable across the board as it focused in on a particular unit doing it. My views haven't changed, so using this as a model, I wouldn't do it but using 80% of it and making it more general, less specific, I think is the way it has to go.

LTC Humberson -

You see it as becoming more general as opposed to taking each CONUSA and tailoring it to that CONUSA area.

LTC Wright -

I would see writing, theoretically, the school writing a standard that is accurate to policy in FORMDEPS, you know, write down the policy line and then where it could be, leave some blank spaces in there where there's a need problem.

COL Miner -

Well, yeah, it wouldn't be bad. If you're talking about what should the War College do with it, I would say that the War College ought to develop it into a system that they could bring DA or FORSCOM into Carlisle, key players, not all the TAG and MUSARC's, obviously they couldn't do that, representatives maybe, and relate it to a situation such as 4102, 5027, or you know, play those, actually play that kind of a game, just like you do, like the college does now with their senior commanders course when they bring them in for scenario type situations. You could do that on the front end of one of those, you could do the mobilization portion, you know, and bring in the key players to handle that. You know, the CINC should have a representative there because a player in the acceptance of a no go unit, but he doesn't need to be a full-time player throughout the whole thing, and then you could just maybe tailor the two of them together, and do a complete start from scratch to employment scenario, and you could do that. You know, the people that aren't playing in down to earth mobilization issues are DA and FORSCOM. We do it, and the CONUSA's haven't been either, I must grant that. It's always been too easy to say ARMAR's do it. Because they were designed to do it, you know, in the extension of the CONUSA's Staff to do mobilization. But now it's time to bring the CONUSA's up to speed, and I understand in the FORSCOM Commander's Conference that

ARMR VIII, that General Arter has asked that Colonel Mires from ARMR VIII make a presentation TCRP to the group to try to convince them that we ought to be doing it, FORSCOM wise. Okay, and he, no matter what they say, he's going to go ahead and do it for the 6th Army, on the basis here, and we're going to invite the other CONUSA's to participate and I'm sure they'll do it . . . at lease a couple, so. . . .

There's some value, but I think the capabilities up there at the War College the technology and so forth, using KETRON or something they could probably improve on it for larger scale, and maybe you'd want to change from what he and I are saying. We're talking out here, we need the education value of it, the training value of it. Up there, if you're going to get people in there that can make decisions, then maybe we can use it as a problem solving at that level.

LTC Wright -

(That'd be nice.)

COL Miner -

You know, if you can get the DCSOPS of the Army to be sitting there and the Vice or the Chief or all of them, and then an issue comes up and somebody says well, that's dumb, why haven't we done something about it. They're the players right there, they can make a decision either to change it at that point or at least to take it on and say okay, we will resolve this issue.

LTC Humberson -

Or if it's a short-fall say yeah we know that's a short-fall, we're going to live with it. At least take a stand on it so everybody knows where we are.



COL Miner -

That's something we can't do anything about, yeah.

LTC Humberson -

Okay, is there anything else that you'd like to share with the study, just a kind of follow-on to the seminar. I know when you were there, I think you were told there would be some kind of follow-up to the thing, and I guess I'm a piece of that, and we're going to sit down and write this thing out in terms of value down the road. Is there anything you'd like to share and make sure it's in that?

LTC Wright -

Well, no, I just hate to see this die at this or at some later date, or a year. It should be something that takes advantage of all this work and gets it into the system.

COL Miner -

I think you guys can push it from here. I guarantee Arter's going to continue to push it until he's told to shut up on it, because he really sees the value of it, and hopefully as a result of your study you see value in it, you can start selling FORSCOM and DA to play the game, and then I guarantee you we're going to do it at 6th Army level.

Okay, thank you for your interest.

LTC Proctor, Mobilization Planner, Fort Carson, Colorado, Autovon 691-2195.

LTC Humberson -

Shortages exist at Fort Carson, Colorado. What would you see as an optimum solution?

LTC Proctor -

We do not perceive any problem with training areas (in the way of ranges maneuver areas). There is a DA, FORSCOM program to upgrade the type of ranges. Also a plan for round-the-clock use of ranges. We do see in the future the inability to house personnel. On 24 February, I briefed a FORSCOM engineer construction validating team for our need and requirement for a 5,000-man hard-shell housing area.

To take care of reserved components coming into Fort Carson for normal year-round annual training, since '81 we've been experiencing three-fold increase in the number of personnel coming to Fort Carson for training (from 3,000 to 9,000). There is no reason to believe the number will stay that small. All indicators are that the number will be increased. Within two years I will lose what is available to two-story wooden-splinter village construction. Those have to come down to make way for maintenance facilities due to Div 86 FORSMOD, etc. So I will have no hard-shell barracks for the soldiers who come here for annual training. We recommended construction for what we call the reserve component complex, to house 5,000 people, the first increment we're asking to come on line '87 completed in '88, has been submitted by

FORSCOM to the DA major construction agency. However, FORSCOM feels that in that we are being asked to spend active duty dollars to construct a facility that is going to be used basically by National Guard or Reserves, that its chances of surviving the "murder board," if you want to call it that (the DA), is unlikely. In my briefing, I pointed out the Department of the Army has given FORSCOM the mission to train, provide a facility, etc., for guard and reserve. FORSCOM has, in line, given that responsibility to Fort Carson, Colorado. It is the active duty's mission to provide the training area, the facilities, etc., for a guard unit or individual or a reserve unit or individual to go train to. That mission has not been given to the guard or reserve. The DA did not tell the guard bureau, "Go to an active duty site you guard or build your own place to live." That's been given to the active duty. So, it doesn't matter who uses the facility, it's an installation mission, and that should not be a distractor in getting the project built. We're looking in the '87, '88 timeframe for the first increment of that facility to be built (which would house approximately 500 people). What would we do if that does not occur or if it slipped or cancel or delay, whatever? We will be relegated to tent cities. We have sufficient tents on hand to house the number of people, if we spread out when they come to Fort Carson. It takes a lot of extra majestic effort to put a unit in a tent and keep them alive, well, healthy, etc. than it does in a hard-shell barracks. You spend a lot of time, money and effort maintaining a tent city that would not have to be done if you were in a hard-shell barracks because of Colorado's severe weather and it's a known fact year-in and year-out, whatever we do, we'll have to provide for winterized training. Which, again, may cause some units to bunch up to try and come to Carson in the summer. What we're doing, then, is

limiting either by type, by number, the kinds of units we bring in here over the long haul. I don't see that we can handle all those that need to come to Carson just during the summer months, that's an impossibility. We bring a lot of our logistics, combat service support, and support units in a year-round mode to Carson. They help the finance matters. They not only train but they perform work for Carson. In finance, medical, dental, maintenance units of all kinds come. The combat units could be earmarked for the summer months. These other units, we need them year-round. We cannot handle everyone who needs to come to Carson in the summer months. FORSCOM's solution is if they don't come to Carson, they'll find some place else to go. I don't think that's a good answer or a viable solution. If they had a meaningful place to go, to get training and support, they would go there instead of coming here.

LTC Humberson -

So your basic answer to the question is: If you receive the 5,000-man hard-shell, that would be optimum. You would pretty well be able to meet the requirements.

LTC Proctor -

Yes. In both peacetime and mobilization.

LTC Humberson -

Regarding one of the other issues that was a sub-element to that 3-A thing had to do with rail requirements and what-have-you on Carson and the potential was that you might have to shift some of these responsibilities outside the mobilization station. What kind of actions are being taken presently or what can be done presently to solve that problem?

LTC Proctor -

Right now zero demand may even have already been submitted for construction is a division railyard improvement program, I call it. The guy that has all that up to date would be the DIO. We have a short-fall in the number of railcars that we know we have to handle on a daily basis for mobilization. We have a plan, a program to load "X" number of cars a day. If we get more days to do it in, we don't have a problem. But the plan now calls for exceeding what our capacity is versus what our requirement is. We've got a greater requirement that we have capacity to handle. So something has to be done, to approve the railyard.

LTC Humberson -

So what you plan to do is to improve the railyard here as opposed to somewhere else.

LTC Proctor -

Yes.

LTC Humberson -

Short-termed, you could put it. . . .

LTC Proctor -

Yes. Go somewhere else, etc., or try and delay units coming in or going out. But that's only an emergency situation--we have to do it right now. Our real goal is to improve the railyard.

LTC Humberson -

Very good. Next question. Would you consider utilizing existing state-owned training facilities or expanding the capabilities here, as a viable alternative?

LTC Proctor -

That is an option but I would not think it's viable because the closest state-owned facility that I know of is in Denver, Colorado, Camp

George West, and that would be putting major units into an area that would already be congested with traffic, etc. Even now, it's congested, let alone under mobilization conditions with the units moving up and down I-25. That would not be a viable option. The only way I would see using Camp George West is that if the unit enroute from that general area north of Carson for some reason, because of weather, missing road connections, or something like that, traffic jam, accidents. They could pull into George West for a short period of time. There is a holding area, with the ultimate goal of moving them down here, but not to make that a permanent or even a semi-permanent processing or training site. It's not a viable option because of its size, lack of capability and its present location in the heart of Denver.

LTC Humberson -

OK. Let's move out a little bit further and consider Guernsey, Wyoming, as a potential.

LTC Proctor -

Guernsey?

LTC Humberson -

As a sub-mob site.

LTC Proctor -

Yes.

LTC Humberson -

What is the optimum of that?

LTC Proctor -

Guernsey could be used as a mobilization site, however, and I would be for that our assets at Carson are limited not only at peacetime but under mobilization conditions. If Guernsey, or a place like that,

should become a mob-station, then resources for the operation and conduct of activities at that mob-station would have to come, I believe, from outside of Fort Carson. Fort Carson's number of people is not sufficient now or at mob under the present TDA, to send teams or run those sites. They would have to come from some other resource or asset. It just isn't possible.

LTC Humberson -

But that could be an A-type solution if those assets--

LTC Proctor -

That is a solution--it would have to be self-sufficient. That is correct. Just by coming up with additional mob sites without resources would not solve the problem.

LTC Humberson -

That's right. So, in terms of resourcing, you'd be thinking in terms of training personnel, logistics personnel--

LTC Proctor -

Personnel, the maintenance, the people who perform, security, operator railyard, operator training facilities, range control, medical, the whole gammet, would have to be scheduled and earmarked to go into those sites in sufficient time to receive those units and prepare for over-seas shipment.

LTC Humberson -

Realizing that there are restraints on building additional facilities here, and you say that its the budget that is killing us and you do go to the intensities and that sort of thing. You kind of indicated that the near-term impacts are that you just have to live in tent cities for training purposes. As far as the training areas, certainly there is no impact, maybe just in housing.

LTC Proctor -

The housing brings you into training problems also. Let's for the sake of argument, say we get a maintenance unit in here. We put them in a tent city we commonly refer to as the "down range area," the training area. It can be as close as five miles from the main cantonment area, it could be as distant as almost fifteen or twenty miles. Once we put that maintenance facility there in that tent city, we are faced with the transportation problem of moving the personnel to either where the vehicles are located and broken to be fixed, or we're faced with an even more monstrous-type transportation problem of moving broken vehicles that need to be fixed to where the soldier is. That's one of our problems. It's not just housing. It would be the same if we had medical people. The medical personnel would come here for training and to help out soldiers, need to operate in and around a hospital. If we put them in a city five miles distant, we've got to move those people back and forth to the hospital complex, or, move sick patients down range to where the doctors and the dentists are. Not smart. It takes more time, more logistics effort to marry the support-type people that are here for training to their customer, you might say. Now it's about the mixed that we get versus support, combat service support, or combat units almost 50-50. Combat units are better suited to go down range, train, run around, maneuver, shoot communicate in a down-range environment. The only time they need to be at the base camp or the cantonment area is for their food, their water, ammunition, go to the PX, the commissary, that type of thing. When you get a support unit in here, in many cases they are not self-sufficient. They do not have their own tents, they do not maintain their organic vehicles. They require that



kind of support from the installation. As a result, they need to be housed close into the area where they're going to work. One of the solutions offered by FORSCOM is the old hospital complex. It is just that, a World War II hospital. It does not have the facility either, latrines, mess hall, arms rooms, orderly rooms. It's just not configured to handle healthy people. It's designed to handle sick people who are in beds, not a combat unit, who are in need of a motor pool, pits, bays for maintenance, arms room storage, orderly rooms, an extensive communication network, latrine facilities for either males and females demand, showers, mess hall, that type of thing. The patients who are able to be in the hospital can walk to their mess hall. There is a mess hall in the hospital, but that is for a significantly small portion versus the number of patients that are served in bed, their three meals a day.

LTC Humberson -

From your perspective, do you see the problem that we've mainly been focusing on as unique to this area, or do you feel that this is probably a problem that other mobilization stations face?

LTC Proctor -

I don't think it's unique to this area, meaning Fort Carson Colorado. Fort Hood, Texas, had the problem and they managed to set a retower to get phone appreciated construction on line back in '77, when, according to the FORSCOM team, it was more in vogue, that that's my word vogue, it was more acceptable to use active duty dollars to support guard and reserve. They, Fort Hood constructed a beautiful facility, just exactly what we're talking about or pretty close to it in design, utilization, etc., at what they call North Fort Hood. Now it's constructed in dollars active duty gets tight, the one Army concept is as

in a vogue term, when it comes to construction in providing "bucks" for the active Army to build a building even though we know it's primarily going to be used by guard and reserve. That's our mission, but of course the FORSCOM people are less willing to do that.

LTC Humberson -

So, basically what you're telling me is a lot of your plans and studies have already been accomplished.

LTC Proctor -

Already accomplished, design is done, the first increment is in writing at this NCA board in DA, but it's felt that activity duty projects for active duty people may take precedent over providing a facility that has been assigned to Fort Carson to do administration, it may not come about because it's primarily going to be used by guard and reserve. I don't see it that way. I see it as a Fort Carson mission. When Carson justified it's new hospital, it didn't come on line and say it's for only active duty. It served a separate bound, retirees. It services civilians in time of an emergency. True, active duty people opt the greatest utilization out of it. True, the facility I'm asking for, the greatest number of people would be guard or reserve units, but that's the mission assigned the active duty of Carson.

LTC Humberson -

But if they weren't using it, certainly the active duty could -

LTC Proctor -

Someone else could use it--that's true. Active duty could use it for various things, but if you give me the mission at Carson as an active duty mission, then you've got to give me the resources, and it shouldn't make any difference who uses it. If an armor unit comes to

Carson to train and they don't have their tanks, and it's my duty to train them, then the tanks here at Carson would be used to train those people. What would be ludicrous would be to say "That's an active duty tank and can only be used to train active duty people." I don't see it that way.

LTC Humberson -

The other issues there on the sheet you have, if you take a look at those and what I'd like for you to think in terms of is, which of those could be addressed or at least bettered with a change in policy, or at least in minimum cost. We're talking here, about facilities and things that cost money, but there appears to be some other issues there that perhaps policy can cover and that involves the no-shows, it involves some of the ideas with regard to the media and this sort of thing. So, if you would think in terms of a low-dollar cost, basically, policy that could address or at least come close to addressing those issues?

LTC Proctor -

I have personnel, item one - Charlie personnel, deferring of soldiers, and what it means here is that we know now in peacetime that we have civilians who occupy key positions, whose expertise, training, etc. will be greatly more needed in the mobilization scenario that even in peacetime. They are also members of a guard or reserve unit. I think, unequivocally, categorically, something needs to be done in the way of policy to either cause them to be removed from that unit that they're in now, where they then would know that their potential will be solely directed to their civilian job at the mob station, in both peacetime and mobilization, or that they not be placed in those critical positions in their civilian job and that they would remain in their unit. Now, there is a policy out already, but I think there's a lot of

"soft-shoeing," a lot of dodging going on, in that regard. I think we're prejudicing people in either side. In either civilian or military side. To get a guy that is to be smart enough to be a battalion commander, he's probably smart enough to be a director at a mobilization station. We've got to make that decision now. Which way is he going to go? and that someone aggressively followed up. Post-mob family assistance, I think, in the way of policy, everything needs to be done to inform those RC personnel, when I say RC I mean guard and reserve, that their families should and must remain at home station and that other measures should be taken to provide their support, at government expense, to whatever they're entitled to have when they go on active duty, in the way of reduced rates at civilian stores, commissary-type food items, medical care, would have to come from the civilian community. To expect the number of family dependents, coming on active duty, to be handled by an active duty installation, is not a viable option. One, there is no place to house them. Two, our resources have already been taxed, handling the RCU member that has already been activated, it's just going to cause a problem. These people aren't civilians. They are out in the civilian community now. They probably have their own doctors, their own ministers, their own favorite store to shop at. What we've got to do on the active duty side is to see that they get the same monetary break, or no cost, for whatever service the active duty members gets now.

Training and assignment of IRR, I would like to support the IRR's training once again as we did in the past, with their assigned units. We would give them better direction, better sense of urgency, they would

have a greater feeling of belonging to the unit, to make it easier to adapt to whatever their job or responsibilities would be in the unit, if the IRR went and trained with his unit every summer.

Reviewing those items again. In the first one, I talked about I-Charlie deciding whether a civilian was in a key position and also in a guard or reserve unit, which way does he go? If he's going to go in the guard, then get him out of the key position, right now, and his future advancement in civilian job market would be limited, because he can't move higher. I-Delta post mob family assistance, again, that should be taken care of on the outside, away from an active duty installation, providing the same degree of care, quality care, at no expense, etc., as an active duty site. 2-Alpha training and assignment if IR, my recommendation would be that they go back to the old system of training with their unit.

LTC Humberson -

In your judgment, and I believe you were a member of the original exercise.

LTC Proctor -

Yes.

LTC Humberson -

Do you feel that these issues that come out of that game are representative of the conditions that exist in mobilization situation now, or do you feel that there are others that should be addressed?

LTC Proctor -

I think the issues that came up, depending on which post you're talking about, one post may have better rail facility and different housing, etc., I think they are representative of issues that need to be

answered, across the board, for the whole Army. That's just my perspective. The fact that there are civilian employees all over--we have retired people who are working in key and critical jobs, on military installations. It would be needed at that installation under mobilization, yet, someone has earmarked them, possibly with hip-pocket orders to go somewhere else. That's a valid issue no matter which post you go to, sir.

LTC Humberson -

In regards to the original exercise, I've got a couple of questions. Did you feel that it was effective and that exercises of that nature would be beneficial to be conducted in the future?

LTC Proctor -

Yes, I think it was an outstanding exercise. The people that were attending the exercise in position, both the active duty side and the guard and reserve representatives were there as well as the headquarters. To provide an input to ration and think as to why things are the way they are, or how they can be changed. I think we need that type of session or future exercises, a tasker to go back to the FORSCOM, DA staff or STARC, wherever it needs to go, for action to be taken, rather than just a seminar which identifies problems and offers possible solutions. I think we ought to go one step further and make that a problem that would be solved--must be solved--by whichever headquarters has proponent agency for, and not just reinvent these problems again, or rediscuss them in future seminars.

LTC Humberson -

That should come from what, probably? FORSCOM?

LTC Proctor -

No, I think DA maybe ought to chair that type of activity and being the DA representative, that person or persons would have the authority to task whether it's FORSCOM, TRADOC, a guard bureau member to task the state STARC, to get on the band wagon, give him a suspense date and solve the problem, rather than just be a discussion.

LTC Humberson -

So probably somebody assigned to DCSOPS that has the power to do that type thing.

LTC Proctor -

DCSOPS, DCSPER, whatever area it falls into. I think, if you have a DA representative there, and he's in power to point the finger and say, "You, FORSCOM, that needs to be solved at your level, you've got ninety days to solve the problem," but where or if it is a DA problem, then it would be done at the DA. The DA guy's task is on headquarters to come up with a solution and pass it out. One thing, I think it was a fantastic exercise, as I said before. It brought all people that have a part, play a part, in this activity that you present, if there was any weakness in the system, I think it could have been longer, to provide more indepth discussion possible solutions. The program could even be expanded to write a decision paper, or to write the problem and all the solutions that have advantages or disadvantages, and then have that paper submitted to whichever headquarters would have the action. I think we can go one step further. If there was anything I was disappointed in, in that particular seminar was the lack of documented feedback, that the exercise was taped, and it's been several months as you know since it's been completed and I'm still waiting on a copy of the TV tape, so I could either show excerpts or the entire thing to other mob

planners at Fort Carson. This is one of the benefits I see in taping. I'd like to get a copy of that, and show it to the other mob planners here and to the command group. To let them know what occurred with all the nuiances of all the open discussion, etc. You just can't get the feeling out of a piece of paper. It would be much better if they could see the tape. Maybe even expand the number of participants, in the next exercise, to have a log rep, a personnel rep, a security rep, a training rep, and maybe they could meet in the mad session and then break off at working committees to try and solve or further identify some of the problems the tasker, or whoever, is going to have the option to solve the problem.

LTC Humberson -

You felt like the format was workable?

LTC Proctor -

Yes, the format was good, facilities could be much larger, if we expand the number of participants. I think the number we have is satisfactory.

LTC Humberson -

Is there any additional information you would like to add to the study of what we're looking at here?

LTC Proctor -

I realize, I'm not sure as to who comprised this particular group. I know who the members were, but I don't recall whether it was a geographical area and they just picked X, Y & Z.

LTC Humberson -

It was ARMR VIII, it was the ten states and--



LTC Proctor -

They just counted the present ARMR VIII.

LTC Humberson -

Or what was ARMR VIII?

LTC Proctor -

Yes, OK. What would possibly be done to help answer some of your questions is--

LTC Humberson -

Is there any additional information that you would like to add to our effort here, and you said yes, that the other ARMR should undergo a similar seminar--

LTC Proctor -

Yes, as a suggestion. Expanded so each ARMR would do this kind of an exercise, maybe even on an annual basis, and then the end of all the ARMRs going through the exercise, come up with a list of problems identified, problems solved, possibly through that seminar, and problems being worked on. I think over an extended period of time, we get a better appreciate for; is it just one particular ARMR's area that we're having a problem, is it common to all the ARMR's in the United States, is it a DA problem, and we get the problem where it needs to be for solving.

LTC Humberson -

And an exchange for solution?

LTC Proctor -

That's right, solutions, answers, that's right. And we'll stop all this duplication. I'm sure, right now there's a guy, just like me, that's got the same problem, banging his head against the wall at it. Chaffe, Fort Bragg, Fort whatever, and I don't know what his solutions

are, he doesn't know what my solutions are, and if we did know that we could save a lot of energy, and get it in the right channel.

LTC Humberson -

Fine. Thank you very much for your time and your interest and for setting down and going through these questions. The only thing that I would add is you're aware there is a study group of us working on this, can you think of something or whatever that should be added?

LTC Proctor -

No.

APPENDIX 2 - MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT IMPROVEMENT PROPOSAL



# State of Wyoming Military Department

## Office of the Adjutant General

POST OFFICE BOX 1706  
CHEYENNE, WYOMING 82003

AG WY (ARNG)

SUBJECT: Mobilization and Deployment Improvement Proposal

Chief  
National Guard Bureau  
ATTN: NGB-ARO-O  
Washington, DC 20310

1. Review and study of mobilization issues affecting Wyoming units and their subordinate capstone alignments indicates a need to seek alternative solutions and means of improving their mobilization and deployment capabilities, especially regarding the 115th Field Artillery Brigade.
2. Of concern are the following:
  - a. Shortages in housing and training areas that exist at the mobilization station (MS) for annual training (AT) and mobilization, (Fort Carson, CO).
  - b. Shortages exist in deployment activities which may cause rail requirements to be shifted away from the MS.
  - c. Great distances the units have to travel to reach their designated MS.
  - d. The excessive waste of valuable training time and resources in reaching the MS.
3. Other considerations which are inherent to full or total mobilization include the following:
  - a. The availability of commercial transportation which is required to move personnel and equipment to the MS. The scheduling of transportation will certainly have a devastating impact on the units' departure and arrival times from home station to the MS and subsequently to posts of embarkation (POE).
  - b. Wyoming units and their capstone subordinate units are located in and will be mobilized in what can be called a mountainous and temperate region, where inclement weather (especially if mobilization were to come during winter) would be an important factor.
  - c. The possibility that the major tenant unit at the MS may not deploy due to an orientation to another requirement (e.g., a European-oriented division which would not deploy for a Pacific requirement), thereby decreasing the capabilities of the MS to perform its functions.

AG WY (ARNG)

SUBJECT: Mobilization and Deployment Improvement Proposal

4. Located in southeastern Wyoming is Camp Guernsey, a state-owned, Wyoming National Guard training site. This installation supported by the Wyoming STARC, can accomplish all pre- and post-mobilization requirements for selected Wyoming units and their capstone counterparts.

a. Location: Camp Guernsey is located in Platte County, in the South-eastern quarter of Wyoming, more precisely Latitude 42° 25' 00" North, Longitude 104° 44' 00" West. The nearest urban area is the town of Guernsey, population 1,512, bordering the Camp. A major railroad freight terminal is located in Guernsey, and the nearest bus terminal is located at Scottsbluff, Nebraska, 66 miles distant.

b. Property Control: State-owned 24,213 acres. Bureau of Land Management (Land Withdrawal) 5,779 acres, for a total of 29,992 acres.

|                              |  |
|------------------------------|--|
| (1) Cantonment Area          | 306 Acres  |
| (2) Army Aviation Facilities | 210 Acres  |
| (3) South Training Area      | 7,580 Acres  |
| (4) North Training Area      | 16,749 Acres + 4 more sections adds<br>6,000 meters to range |
| (5) Impact Area              | 3,787 Acres  |
| (6) Ammunition Storage Area  | 1,360 Acres  |
| TOTAL                        | 29,992 Acres + plus above extra meters                       |

c. Physical Description: This site consists of 29,992 acres, of which 26,205 acres are available for training. The terrain is rolling hills covered with blue green, buffalo grass, and sagebrush. Trees along the drainages are cottonwood, with ponderosa pine and junipers on the hillsides and tops. The elevation at Camp Guernsey ranges from 4,300 feet to 5,280 feet above mean sea level (MSL). The major soil type is a fine sandy loam, M-4 Ustall. There are four major desimentary rock formations, conglomerate, dolomite, limestone, and sandstone. The four distinct seasons are prevalent with the mean daytime summer temperature in the mid-eighties, and the mean daytime winter temperature in the low-twenties. Average precipitation is 15.06 inches, 70 percent of which falls during the growing season, primarily in June. The prevailing winds are North-westerly. Maximum winds, average 40 MPH, are in the latter part of February and March.

d. Facilities: There are sufficient buildings, metal hutments, and trailer houses to house 182 officers and 1,730 enlisted personnel. Use of tents, GP medium on hand, on available concrete slabs would increase housing to accommodate an additional 200 enlisted personnel. Mess facilities will support 1,800 people per meal with a troop issue subsistence activity (TISA). There are three administrative buildings, seven supply buildings, vehicle shop (10 bays), vehicle hard-stands (84,700 square yards), vehicle wash racks (36 stalls), and an ammunition storage and issue facility on site. Medical facilities consist of one dispensary building available for Reserve Component medical support. Platte County Memorial Hospital (43 beds) is located in Wheatland, 25 miles distant.

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e. Army Aviation Facilities: This consists of 210 acres, one administrative/operations building (1,200 square feet), one hanger (2,829 square feet), 20 helicopter tie-down pads, and apron (8,240 square yards). There are two runways, 14-31 (5,500 feet by 100 feet) and 16-34 (3,600 feet by 100 feet), with graveled surfaces. Crash, fire, and rescue equipment is available.

f. Ranges:

| <u>Type</u>                             | <u>Number</u> | <u>Total Firing Points</u> |
|---|---------------|----------------------------|
| KD Rifle 600 yards                      | 1             | 11                         |
| KD Rifle 100, 200, 300, 500 yards       | 1             | 18                         |
| Basic 25-Meter                          | 1             | 18                         |
|   | 1             | 35                         |
| Pistol, .45 Caliber                     | 1             | 20                         |
| Pistol, .45 Caliber                     | 1             | 15                         |
| MG M60, 10-Meter                        | 1             | 17                         |
| MG M60, Transition                      | 1             | 10                         |
| MG M2, .50 Caliber Field                | 1             | 10                         |
| LAW, 66 MM                              | 1             | 10                         |
| Recoilless Rifle                        | 1             | 10                         |
| Grenade Launcher, 40MM                  | 1             | 4                          |
| Helicopter Gunship                      | 1             | 18                         |
| Demolition                              | 1             | 10                         |
| Demolition                              | 1             | 10                         |
| Mortar (all calibers)                   | 1             |                            |
| Artillery (all calibers except 175MM)   | 1             |                            |
| Min range, direct fire                  |               |                            |
| Max range, 16,000 meters + 6,000 meters |               |                            |

g. Specialized Training Areas: Float bridging, rafting, and watermanship training can be conducted on the Platte River and Lake Guernsey. Two rock-crusher sites with limestone quarries are on post. One compass course with 65 points in 48 acres, and a squad-size chemical confidence chamber is available. One map-of-the-earth (MOE) flying area with four separate training courses is available.

h. Utilities: The water system has a capacity of 198,000 gallons per day and will support 3,780 persons. The sewage treatment plant is lagoon-type with a capacity of 132,300 gallons per day.


i. Restrictions: Restricted airspace for artillery firing available 1 March through 30 November annually. Controlled firing areas can be obtained at other times. Maximum ordinate cannot exceed 23,500 feet mean sea level.

j. Point of Contact: During duty hours: Autovon: 943-6273/6396; Commercial (307) 772-6273 or (307) 836-2619/2823. After duty hours: Commercial (307) 632-7350 or (307) 836-2339.

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5. Designation of Camp Guernsey as a mobilization station relieves the concerns expressed above and offers innumerable advantages for Wyoming units as well as providing vital relief to over-taxed AC mobilization stations. Invaluable post-mobilization training time will be gained through this proposed designation.
6. An indepth study indicates the capability of Camp Guernsey to accommodate and provide validation for units during the initial stages of mobilization.
7. Request favorable consideration and necessary coordination to designate Camp Guernsey, Wyoming, as a FORSCOM mobilization station be effected.
8. Point of contact this headquarters is Colonel Ellis Caldwell, Autovon 943-6264.

  
JAMES L. SPENCE  
MG, WY ARNG  
The Adjutant General

2 Incls

Map, Garrison, Camp Guernsey

Map, Training Area, Camp Guernsey

cf: SRAAG Wyoming

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